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Abstract 
 The Air Force is searching for measures to reduce cost growth in defense 
acquisitions during times of constrained budgets across the Department of Defense.  
Previous DoD cost growth studies found typical cost growth in defense acquisitions is 
around forty-six to sixty percent of the original estimate.  The research in this study 
addresses the identification of risk and uncertainty benchmarks by providing decision 
makers with coefficient of variation ranges for cost estimates.  The hypothesis is that if 
cost estimates include enough risk and uncertainty adjustments then the DoD could more 
accurately estimate programs and therefore reduce cost growth.  The intentions of the 
study are to recommend coefficient of variation (CV) ranges for Air Force Acquisition 
programs, determine if different CV ranges should be used based on platform type, and 
determine if CV decreases over the course of the program’s acquisition lifecycle. This 
research is unique to previous cost growth studies because it employs source data from 
program offices in addition to Selective Acquisition Reports to answer the research 
questions.  The analysis found that the Air Force should enhance the CV review process 
to ensure cost estimates have CVs between 41-74% during Milestone A, 31-54% during 
Milestone B, and 23-32% during Milestone C.  It is recommended that Selective 
Acquisition Reports include the CV utilized to develop the current estimate.  The analysis 
also found that CVs are analogous among platform types.  There is not a necessity to 
operationalize CV ranges by product center or weapon system type.  Lastly, the research 
found that CVs decrease as a program matures through the acquisition lifecycle. 
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Investigation into Risk and Uncertainty: Identifying Coefficient of Variation 
Benchmarks for Air Force ACAT I Programs 
 
I. Introduction 
The current economic climate necessitates that Department of Defense (DoD) 
leaders make better decisions allocating resources.  The department invested $131B in 
procurement programs in 2011 (DoD, 2012: 2).  The investment of such a large amount 
of taxpayer dollars in defense acquisitions requires accurate cost estimates to aid decision 
makers in allocating resources.  Unfortunately, cost estimators are notorious for 
underestimating the procurement cost of new technologies and weapon systems.  The 
total acquisition cost of DoDs 2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has 
grown by nearly $300B over initial estimates (GAO, 2008:4).  The significant cost 
growth has led to high visibility on cost estimates of major defense acquisition programs.  
The pressure to contain cost growth on DoD leaders compels them to demand more 
accurate means of forecasting expenses.  
Background 
 Cost estimating is a critical function in Air Force weapon system acquisitions.  
Highlighting its prominence, DoD mandates all programs receive certification of 
affordability to Congress in order to proceed through the Defense Acquisition System 
(DAS) Milestone process.  The certification of affordability is given by the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) with concurrence from the Director of Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (DCAPE) (DoDI 5000.2,2010).  The certification of affordability is 
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granted only after at least two cost proposals are submitted to the CAPE from the System 
Program Office (SPO) and the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) (DoDI 
5000.2,2010).  The CAPE then determines the most realistic cost of the program and 
makes an affordability decision.  Despite this vast rigor and oversight, the Air Force 
continually underestimates acquisition programs’ cost (Arena and others, 6:2006).  
Critics arguments include the topics: congressional rent seeking; program managers 
lobbying for jobs; government contractors superior business skills; abundances of federal 
regulations; unrealistic expectations; underdeveloped technologies; and overly optimistic 
assumptions (McNaughter, 1989:2) (Cowen and Lee, 1992, 219) (Lee, 1990: 129).   The 
ability to accurately measure expenses that should occur in the future is a challenging 
concept.  In order to capture the ambiguity in predicting the future, cost estimators apply 
different methods to incorporate reality including: standard deviation, variance, Monte 
Carlo simulation, and coefficient of variation.  While each of these measures has a 
purpose, this research focuses on the coefficient of variation.  The coefficient of variation 
(CV) is a measurement of dispersion around the mean.  It is defined by the standard 
deviation divided by the mean (Hald, 1952: 77).  
                                                                    CV =   
 
 
                                                             (1.1)           
where       
CV = Coefficient of Variation 
µ = mean 
σ = standard deviation  
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Space Systems Aircraft Systems Electronic Systems
Program Type
35-45% 25-35% 10-20%
It influences cost estimators because they attempt to capture a realistic estimate with a 
range of uncertainty.  An accurate assessment of the uncertainty will fall in a particular 
CV range.  If the estimate’s CV is higher than the CV range, it informs decision makers 
that there is significant risk in the program.  If the estimate’s CV is lower than the CV 
range, it informs decision makers that the program estimate may be overly optimistic 
unless there is sound reason. 
Problem Statement 
 The DoD mandated that risk analysis be incorporated as standard cost estimating 
practice in 1970 (Arena, 2006:2).  However, it was not until 2007 that the Air Force 
provided coefficient of variation (CV) standards to guide cost analysts.  These standards 
were developed by the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA), a field operating 
agency whose mission is to perform independent cost and risk analysis and provide 
special studies to aid long-range planning (Air Force Magazine, 2011:63). As part of their 
charter, AFCAA conducted a risk study on behalf of the Air Force and published the 
results in the 2007 version of the Air Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty Handbook 
(AFCRUH).  During this time, AFCAA began using CV as an evaluation criterion when 
reviewing Program Office Estimates (POE).  AFCAA questions the validity of the cost 
estimate if the POE is outside the published ranges. See Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: CV Ranges Published in AFCRUH 
 
 
Table 1.1  CV Ranges Published in AFCRUH 
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AFCAA determined the CV ranges on estimates for a given program are 10-20% on large 
scale electronics systems, 25-35% on aircraft systems, and 35-45% on space systems 
(AFCAA, 2007:26).   
The published ranges are associated with previous cost estimate performances in 
the respective programs.  The ranges are guidelines for the program throughout the 
lifecycle and remain stagnant and unchanged.  The concern of this research is that early 
in a lifecycle, System Development and Demonstration for example, it is difficult to 
accurately capture the uncertainty in a cost estimate.  The uncertainty associated with the 
cost of the system should change as time progresses.  As a system matures in 
development and production, more information is gathered which aids cost estimators in 
mitigating the uncertainty in the estimate.  Thus, the standard for CV should theoretically 
decrease as time progresses. Brian Flynn and Paul Garvey, conducting research for the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis, supported this claim with their study on Department of 
Navy acquisition programs in 2011.  Additionally, Flynn and Garvey found that CV 
ranges were consistent for all systems regardless of program type (Flynn and Garvey, 
2011:29).  Their research varies from the Air Force study which suggests different CV 
ranges for each type of program (space, electronics, and aircraft).   
The studies conducted by AFCAA and Flynn and Garvey used Selective 
Acquisition Reports (SAR) as the basis for their data (Flynn and Garvey, 2011:21) 
(AFCAA, 2007: 26).  The problem with this approach is SAR data provides only a point 
estimate for budgeting purposes of a system.  The uncertainty metrics: Monte Carlo 
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distributions, confidence intervals, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation are not 
provided in the SAR. 
Research Focus 
 The previous methods used by Flynn and AFCAA to analyze CV utilized data 
from SARs.  Due to the inherent problems associated with SAR data, this analysis will 
take a different approach by analyzing cost estimates obtained directly from the 
individual program offices.  This method of data collection removes the interpolation of 
uncertainty metrics, like coefficient of variation, contained in SARs.  The data from the 
program offices includes all of the uncertainty metrics employed by cost estimators.  
Additionally, the integrity of primary data from program offices provides validity to the 
analysis.   
 The use of primary data provides reliability to the analysis, but also introduces a 
few limitations.  The advantage of utilizing Selective Acquisition Reports is that they are 
centrally located and easily accessible.  Using data from the Air Force systems centers 
(aerospace, electronics, and space and missile) means three different product centers 
gather and provide data for the study.  The data for this analysis is limited to the amount 
available at the three product centers.  As such, all acquisition programs are not used to 
formulate the conclusions.  This research is limited to the ACAT-I programs from each of 
the program offices.  Currently, there are 51 ACAT-I programs in the Air Force 
(DAMIR, 2012).  This research examines 30 of the available programs in the Air Force.   
 Another limitation of this study is it focuses only on coefficient of variation.  
There are several other factors used to capture uncertainty in a cost estimate; however, 
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the growing popularity of cost estimators focusing on CV and the recent emphasis on CV 
from AFCAA makes this metric important for cost estimators.    This study does not 
analyze any of the other uncertainty metrics due to the size of the study required to 
accomplish such an analysis.   
Research Questions 
 The following research questions are investigated: 
1 – Does analyzing the coefficient of variation ranges from Selective Acquisition Reports 
and Program Office Estimates match the coefficient of variation ranges provided by 
AFCAA in the AFCRUH?  
2 – Should there be different coefficient of variation ranges for dissimilar platform types 
(aerospace, electronics, and Space and Missiles) for Air Force programs? 
3 – Do coefficient of variations for Air Force programs change over time? 
Model and Implications 
 This study employs paired t-tests and Tukey methods to capture the accuracy of 
the factors contributing to a significant coefficient of variation range.  The analysis 
includes paired t-tests to measure the change in CV over time.  The outputs of the Monte 
Carlo simulations conducted by the program offices and the CVs calculated from the 
SARs serve as the inputs to the models.  The conclusion as to whether or not CVs 
decrease over time in Air Force programs is dependent upon the paired t-test results.   
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 The Tukey method is used to uncover whether or not there should be different CV 
ranges for dissimilar platform types.  It is a multiple comparison procedure used to 
indentify statistical differences among means (Peck and others, 2001:768).  The Tukey 
method analyzes the differences in means for the CVs to determine if the platform types 
should be categorized differently.  The results of the Tukey method determine if the 
different platform types should have separate CV ranges.  Once the Tukey method is 
applied, the CV ranges for each group are captured.  These CV ranges reflect the 
recommended CV range for each platform type.   
The value of cost estimates is measured by the utility of the decision maker.  Cost 
estimates serve as one of many tools available to decision makers who balance resources 
to accomplish the mission.   By increasing the integrity of the uncertainty captured in cost 
estimates, decision makers will have more faith in the estimates.  The decision makers 
will gain confidence in cost estimators when deciding which programs to fund since the 
cost estimates will represent a more realistic picture of a program over its entire lifecycle.   
Summary 
 Department of Defense budgets are decreasing.  The value of cost estimators is 
increasing as the Air Force uses taxpayer dollars more diligently.  Cost estimators are 
employed to provide an accurate assessment of future costs of resources to decision 
makers.  One of the measures to capture the uncertainty of a cost estimate is the 
coefficient of variation.  This analysis will utilize paired t-tests and Tukey analysis to find 
the most constructive range for CV throughout the acquisition lifecycle. 
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 The remainder of this thesis is divided into four additional chapters: literature 
review, methodology, results, and conclusions.  Chapter two, the literature review, 
examines the value of cost estimating, the role of uncertainty within cost estimating, and 
the previous research conducted on CV.  Chapter three, methodology, explains in detail 
the techniques used to analyze the CV.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide the 
reader with a step-by-step method in order for them to reiterate the process and achieve 
the same results.  Chapter four explains the findings and significance of the proposed 
research questions.  Lastly, chapter five concludes the research and provides the practical 
implications for the cost analyst.  It also provides the framework for future research 
concerning this topic. 
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II. Literature Review 
 This chapter is an overview of related topics and previous research.   This 
literature review focuses on the relevance of cost estimating, the importance of capturing 
uncertainty in cost estimating, and the function of coefficient of variation in cost 
estimates.  The following sections provide brief descriptions of the literature that the 
researcher reviews to conduct the analysis.  The topics of the literature review provide the 
reader with an understanding of the scope of the study. 
Cost Estimating 
 Cost estimating is a discipline focused on collecting and analyzing data using 
quantitative and qualitative techniques to forecast costs which aid decision makers with 
allocating resources.  It is both an art and science because of the limited information, 
variety of techniques, and importance of communication that is attributed to the estimate 
(Air Force Cost Analysis Handbook, 1-3:2007).  The value of cost estimating is reflected 
in the legislation which mandates cost estimates be conducted for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP).  An MDAP is not allowed to proceed to the next phase 
of the acquisition process without approval of the milestone decision authority whose 
performance is reported to Congress (DoDD 5000.1, 4:2007).   
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The milestone decision authority determines the “affordability” of an MDAP at 
Milestone B and Milestone C, shown in Figure 2.1, based on cost estimates which 
include total life-cycle or, if available, total ownership cost (DoDI 5000.2, 23: 2008).  
Total life-cycle costs include the expenses incurred for conceptual analysis, technological 
development, requirements planning, acquisition, and operations and maintenance (GAO, 
2009:1).  The life-cycle costs capture all funds incurred for developing, operating, and 
disposing of a weapon system.   
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2.1 Defense Program Acquisition Framework 
Affordability 
The affordability statement’s purpose is to ensure a MDAP fits in DoD long-range 
plans, and the resources are available to fully fund the program for its entire lifecycle 
(Defense Acquisition Guidebook 3.2; 2010).  All participants in the acquisition process 
need to consider cost and performance independently to ensure DoD can afford a 
program beyond the procurement effort. Therefore, the affordability assessment cannot 
be completed without an estimate of the entire lifecycle (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
Figur  2.1 Defense Program Acquisition Fra ork i  .    i i i  Figure 2.1 Defense Progr  Acquisition Framework 
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3.2.4: 2010).  The affordability assessment is based on a point estimate of the system’s 
costs.  Although cost estimators attempt to capture risk and uncertainty, the final decision 
is based off of one number produced by the cost estimators. 
Point Estimates 
 A point estimate represents a number within a range of possible values 
representing the total life-cycle cost of a program (AFCAA, 2007:1).   The point estimate 
in the DoD cost community is the best estimate of a system and its requirements minus 
risk and uncertainty.  A point estimate starts with a program manager approving a Cost 
Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) developed by cost estimators.  The cost 
estimators rely on engineers, program managers, and developers as the technical experts 
when constructing a CARD.  The CARD represents the Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) of a program with associated costs for each element.  The arithmetic sum of each 
program element in a CARD represents the Technical Baseline Estimate (TBE).  A TBE 
is a point estimate; however, it does not typically represent the point estimate chosen as 
the baseline of a program.  It represents the arithmetic sum of most likely values for each 
WBS element. The TBE is a traceable reference point on which the cost risk analysis is 
anchored (AFCAA, 2007:2).   
 The value of each element in the CARD is derived from different estimating 
techniques including: analogy/factors, parametric, engineering build-up, extrapolation 
from actual, and Subject Matter Expert (SME) (AFCAH, 2007:Ch3, 1).  The 
analogy/factor method uses costs of similar systems previously developed as a tool to 
estimate the cost of the weapon system currently being developed.  The parametric 
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method uses Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) based on historical data to estimate 
the project’s cost.  The parametric method applies cost drivers, such as weight and size, 
to derive the cost of the element in the WBS.  The engineering build-up method sums the 
costs from the lower levels of the WBS to provide a traceable estimate for the WBS 
element.  The extrapolation from actual method uses data already obtained from the 
current development to estimate future expenses; learning curves are an example of 
actual data extrapolation. Lastly, the Subject Matter Expert method involves asking 
professionals closely related to the activity for their input for forecasting costs of the 
WBS element (AFCAH, 2007:Ch3, 1) (GAO, 2009:107-112). 
 The risk-adjusted position of a program estimate incorporates cost risk analysis 
methods which add risk and uncertainty to the point estimate.  The cost estimators 
capture risk and uncertainty in the estimate by applying simulation techniques to 
individual elements in the CARD.   Finally, one number is selected as the estimate for a 
program based on the most realistic assumptions available at the time.   The program 
estimate is selected from a cumulative distribution function derived from Monte Carlo, 
Crystal Ball®, or Latin Hypercube simulation techniques (NAVSEA, 2005: 4-24).  
Generally, the mean is selected as the point estimate which is approximately the 50-60 
percent confidence level (AFCAH, 2007: Ch 11, 5).  However, some program offices, 
Aerospace Systems Center for example, previously elected to use the 90 percent 
confidence level to capture more risk and uncertainty when selecting the point estimate 
(Hudson, 2005).  As of February 2013, program offices have elected to evaluate 
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programs at the mean.  The standard is constantly changing.  Figure 2.2 shows the output 
of a Monte Carlo simulation and a selected risk-adjusted estimate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts a range of possible estimates.  A more conservative program manager 
would choose a value with a higher probability of success.  The problem with providing 
decision makers with only a point estimate is it can be deceiving.  The Government 
Accountability Office found unrealistically low estimates for space acquisition systems 
and Navy Shipbuilding Programs, in part because of poor choices on the selection of the 
risk-adjusted estimate (GAO, 2006: 13) (GAO, 2005: 5) . 
 The derivation of a point estimate is not a clearly defined process.  There is no 
standardized guidance on the selection of a risk-adjusted estimate.  The estimate can 
represent the ‘most likely’ cost (mode), the 50% confidence cost (median), the ‘average’ 
cost (mean), or any other descriptive statistic believed to be the most realistic 
representation of a program’s expected cost. The uncertainty and confusion as to what a 
point estimate truly represents makes it virtually useless to decision makers (Book, 2004).  
Figure 2.3 represents different ‘most likely’ costs of programs with different distributions 
Figure 2.2 Point Estimate 
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attributed to the estimate.  Figure 2.3 depicts the uncertainty and confusion as to what 
point estimates represent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Most Likely Cost Estimates (Book, 2004) 
 The point estimate is derived from costs listed on the CARD developed by cost 
estimators, engineers, program managers, and developers.  The CARD does not contain 
all necessary information to make a realistic cost estimate though.  The CARD does not 
take into account the risk of building a system (Book, 2004).  The CARD is a technical 
description of the program and is not used to list the associated risks of a program.  The 
risk-management plan should be used to build a cost estimate in conjunction with the 
CARD.  The risk-management plan lists risk issues that could cause problems during 
development and increase the expected cost.  The risk issues are not listed in the CARD 
because they are not certain; however, if one of the listed risk factors occurs during 
development it impacts the cost of procuring the weapon system (Book, 2004).  A 
program’s cost is not well represented by any singular number.  A cost risk analysis 
Figure 2.3 Most Likely Cost Estimates (Book, 2004) Figure 2.3  Most Likely Cost Estimates (Bo k, 20 4) 
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should be conducted and briefed to decision makers to provide more valuable information 
as to what the risk adjusted estimate accurately represents (Book, 2004). 
Point estimates often give decision makers little valuable information about the 
likelihood of success of an estimate (GAO, 2009: 21). Due to the inherent nature of 
forecasting, it is challenging to accurately assess the cost of a program years before it is 
completely developed, manufactured, and disposed.  Providing decision makers with only 
a single value as the estimate is one reason DoD acquisitions struggles with cost and 
schedule overruns in defense procurement projects. 
Cost Growth 
 Cost growth in defense acquisitions is the difference between the final cost of a 
program and the estimated cost of a program using Milestone B estimates. It is usually 
discussed in terms of a metric called the Cost growth Factor (CGF) which is a ratio of the 
final, or most recent, cost divided by the Milestone B estimate (Arena and others, 2006 
:19).  A CGF less than 1.0 indicates a program that cost less than initially budgeted.  A 
CGF greater than 1.0 represents a program that has overrun its budget.   
Cost growth has been studied for decades by various institutions; however, the 
three primary contributors to cost growth studies are RAND Corporation, Institute for 
Defense Analyses, and U.S. Government Accountability Office.  The cost growth studies 
have historically used Selective Acquisition Report (SAR) data to evaluate the cost 
growth on defense programs. The studies use the published SAR data to calculate the 
CGFs of different programs.   
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As early as 1950 researchers found inaccurate cost estimates (Alchain, 1: 1950).  
In 1950, RAND measured the reliability of different cost estimates.  RAND measured the 
accuracy of engineering estimates, cost estimator’s reliability, public engineer’s 
construction cost estimates, and the variations among contractor’s bids.  Figure 2.4 
summarizes the variance of the cost estimate accuracy in RAND’s 1950 study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 1950 RAND Cost Reliability Results 
The purpose of the study was to quantify the reliability of different types of cost 
estimates.  RAND showed with 90% confidence in the 1950s that initial cost estimates 
vary between 10 and 23% of the actual cost.  RAND identified unclear specifications, 
changes to specifications, and variance among manufacturers as the primary reason for 
the estimating differences.  The study shed light on a topic that continues to be studied 60 
years later. 
GAO Space Acquisition Cost Growth 
A U.S. Government of Accountability office publication found original cost 
estimates for space programs increase by 44 percent (GAO, 2006: 1).  The study focused 
Figure 2.4 1950 RAND Cost Reliability Results 
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on six major space acquisition programs in the Air Force.  The GAO used a case study 
methodology to examine which areas in cost estimates for space system acquisition have 
been unrealistic and what incentives and pressures contributed to the quality and 
usefulness of cost estimating. The results of the analysis showed a tendency for Air Force 
to start space acquisition programs with unrealistic requirements because of pressures to 
secure funding.  The study found the program office estimates were too optimistic and 
the Air Force did not rely heavily enough on the required Independent Cost Estimates 
(ICE) (GAO, 2006: 32-37).  It appears the program office estimates were selected as the 
baseline estimate because they were lower than the ICE and more likely to acquire 
funding.  Figure 2.5 shows three baseline estimates where the program office estimate 
was lower than the ICE due to unrealistic assumptions in order to secure funding (GAO, 
2006: 37-40).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Optimistic Cost Estimates for Space Systems 
Figure 2.5  Optimistic Cost Estimates for Space Systems 
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IDA Major Causes of Cost Growth 
A study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) cited poor 
management and weak program definition (Porter and others, 23: 2010).  The IDA was 
sponsored by the Office of the Director Acquisition Resources & Analysis (OUSD 
AT&L) and tasked to seek a deeper understanding of the decisions and mistakes that 
contribute to cost growth.  The IDA studied 11 programs that entered full-scale 
development and experienced significant cost growth.  The study team reviewed cost 
history data and interviewed cost estimators and senior acquisition officials.  The study 
relied heavily on SAR data, typical of the majority of cost growth studies conducted in 
the defense industry.  The IDA claimed poor acquisition management was responsible for 
inappropriate implementation of policies. The weak program definition led to unstable 
requirements, decisions based on immature technologies, and excessive schedule 
compression (Porter and others 23, 2010).  The findings of the IDA study are shown in 
Figure 2.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6  Major Causes for Cost Growth (Porter and others, 2010: 24) 
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Sources of Cost Growth 
More research cited poor cost estimating and increases in requirements lead to 
cost growth during the development phase of the acquisition lifecycle.  Quantity changes 
are responsible for procurement cost growth; while the largest contributor to cost growth 
is poor managerial decisions (Bolten and others, 46:2008).  
No matter the cause, all poor estimates lead to unrealistic budgeting and 
underfunded programs (McNicol, 9:2004).  The studies suggest poor initial cost 
estimating leads to cost growth.  Even though the topic is analyzed extensively, the trend 
of cost growth remains high with little significance of improvement (Younossi and 
others, 45: 2007).  
Cost Growth Trending 
 Cost growth is not a new problem for DoD.  Cost growth in defense acquisitions 
has been studied for over fifty years (Fox and others 2001:7).  As far back as the 1950s, 
the President, Congress, Secretary of Defense, and service chiefs have launched 
initiatives to curb cost growth through acquisition reforms.  In the 1950s and 60s business 
executives Robert McNamara and David Packard launched management initiatives to 
centrally control acquisition decisions (Fox and others, 2011:43).  McNamara and 
Packard’s influence on the defense acquisition process can still be seen in the current 
structure.  
 In the 1970s the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was established to identify the 
reasons for defense acquisition cost growth and schedule overruns.  The Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel stood up several government agencies and policies to improve the defense 
 
20 
acquisition process which are still functioning today: Defense Systems Acquisition 
Review Council (DSARC), Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), DoD Directive 
5000.1, DoD Instruction 5000.2, and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR) 
2011, (Fox and others, 2011:62-95).  
The 1980s was a period that experienced substantial defense budget increases 
with the help of President Ronald Reagan.  The Regan administration increased defense 
procurement budgets by as much as sixty-one percent (Fox and others, 2011: 101).  The 
increased budgets were coupled with fewer restrictions which are believed to be a direct 
contribution to many allegations against the DoD for fraud, waste, and abuse.  Much of 
the acquisition reforms of the 1980s were initiated to curtail the fraud, waste, and abuse 
allegations.  The 1980s is responsible for producing the Title V of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1987 which prompted a division of labor between acquisition management and 
support functions at the command level (Fox and others, 2001: 138).  Also, the Nunn-
McCurdy Amendment was put in place which requires a notification to congress if there 
is cost growth greater than fifteen percent and a termination of the program if cost grows 
by more than twenty-five percent, unless the secretary of defense can provide a detailed 
explanation certifying the program is essential (Fox and others, 2011: 120).   
The 1990s were focused on introducing a more responsive, effective, and efficient 
approach to defense acquisition.  There were more than sixty-three acquisition reforms in 
the 90s (Hanks and others, 2005:94).  Several of the key acquisition reforms include: 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990 (DAWIA), Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 
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(FARA), Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV), and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
(Hanks and others, 2005: 1994). 
The 2000s remained relatively quiet until 2009 when the Weapon System 
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) was signed into law by President Barack Obama.   
Before WSARA, major program spending limits, phases and milestones were redefined.  
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development (JCID) process was introduced along 
with the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) to continue a history of introducing 
acquisition legislation (Fox and others, 2011, 225-227).  WSARA was the largest piece of 
acquisition legislation introduced in the twenty-first century.  WSARA aims on 
increasing focus on trading off cost, performance, and schedule, increasing systems 
engineering efforts earlier in the program lifecycle, providing clearer guidance on 
analysis of alternatives and cost estimating procedures, increasing competition 
throughout the program lifecycle, and restricting the organization, including the 
appointment of several new administrative officials (DAU, 2010).   
Despite the dozens of acquisition reforms and legislation changes, the 
explanations for cost growth remain focused around the same five principles first 
identified in the 1950s: 1) schedule slippage, 2) lack of qualified personnel, 3) high 
turnover frequency, 4) inadequate cost estimating, 5) insufficient management on 
contractor performance, 6) unclear requirements definition (Fox and others, 2011, 35).  
Cost growth is and has always been a problem. Realistic cost estimates will allow 
decision makers to make more informed decisions when choosing among major weapon 
systems.  In order to educate decision makers, it is important to provide them with a cost 
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range and not a single estimate.  A cost estimate is not an absolute number which will 
remain constant (Fisher, 1:1962).  An estimate is based on agreed upon assumptions that 
cannot all be true, but rather, as accurate as possible. It is imperative that risk and 
uncertainty are captured in all cost estimates.    
Risk and Uncertainty 
 Although the terms risk and uncertainty are commonly interchangeable in casual 
conversation, the two concepts are unique for this research.  Risk is defined as the chance 
of loss or injury.  Uncertainty is the indefiniteness about the outcome of an event (Air 
Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty Handbook, 4: 2007).  It is extremely unlikely that the 
forecasted number will actually reflect the true cost of a weapon system.  The lack of 
knowledge about the future is only one reason for the difference.  Equally important 
reasons are inaccuracies in historical data, poor assumptions, equations, and relative 
factors used to derive an estimate (GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, 153: 
2009). The inabilities of cost estimators to accurately estimate MDAPs are evidence of 
the need to capture uncertainty around a point estimate.      
 Less information is known about a program early in the lifecycle.  As a MDAP 
progresses through the acquisition lifecycle, more data is collected that accurately reflects 
the outcome of the program.  Therefore, cost estimates are more accurate later in the 
programs lifecycle (Arena and others, 39: 2008).   
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The changes in uncertainty of a cost estimate are reflected in Figure 2.7 (GAO, 
2009:155). 
  
 
 
 
 
It is important to communicate to decision makers that there is more uncertainty in the 
point estimate earlier in the MDAP lifecycle.   Cost estimators present their data as point 
estimates, but also include various descriptive statistics to capture risk and uncertainty to 
communicate the likelihood of the program overrunning.     
Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics are valuable for portraying the risk and uncertainty in cost 
estimates.  Cost estimators often choose to brief decision makers with different statistics 
to represent uncertainty including:  mean, median, mode, confidence interval, standard 
deviation, cumulative distribution functions, correlation, and coefficient of variation 
(AFCAH, 2007: 94).  A cost estimator uses the different statistics to portray various 
characteristics of the estimate.  To capture risk and uncertainty, an estimator produces 
multiple estimates or simulates different ‘what-if’ scenarios (GAO, 2009: 185). The mean 
is the average of all estimates divided by the number of trials.  The mode is the most 
Figure 2.7  Changes in Cost Estimate Uncertainty across the Acquisition Lifecycle 
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common estimate of all trials.  The median is the middle value of all trials.  In Monte 
Carlo simulation the estimate is usually replicated between 10,000 to 100,000 times, 
which is simple to produce with modern computing capabilities.  As the number of trials 
increases in size the mean, median, and mode converge until: 
Mean = Median = Mode = µ = 2
1
1
( 1)
n
ii
x
n 
                           (1.2) 
This represents the ‘most likely’ value which represents the 50 percent confidence level 
(GAO, 2009:167).     
 The confidence level is the percent of certainty in the estimate.  It represents an 
interval around the mean (Sachs, 1982: 112).  An 80 percent confidence level represents a 
value where 80 percent of the Monte Carlo simulations produced an estimate at that value 
or lower.  To a decision maker, an 80 percent confidence level depicts an estimate that 
has a 20 percent chance of exceeding the budget (AFCAH, 2008: 11-13).  Figure 2.8 
shows a cumulative distribution function (CDF) and previously mentioned statistical 
parameters. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Cumulative Distribution Function Figure 2.8  Cumulative Distribution Function 
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 A cumulative distribution function is commonly referred to as an S-curve 
(AFCAH, 2008: 11-13).  A Monte Carlo simulation produces a CDF depicting the 
different parameters (Dienemann, 12: 1966).  The CDF represents the probability that a 
random variable assumes a value less than or equal to the given confidence level (Sachs, 
1982: 44).   
 Standard deviation is another statistical parameter commonly used by estimators 
to scale risk and uncertainty.  The standard deviation is used to determine the amount of 
dispersion around the mean of a given data set (GAO, 2009: 97).  Larger standard 
deviations in estimates represent larger uncertainty. The standard deviation essentially 
measures the average distance between data points and the mean (AFCAH, 2007: 64).  It 
is valuable for analyzing data points in the same data set; however, to compare variances 
between different data sets coefficient of variation is a more effective measure. 
Coefficient of Variation 
 The coefficient of variation (CV) is becoming one of the most recognized metrics 
to characterize cost estimating risk and uncertainty distributions (AFCAH, 2007: 64).  It 
is defined by the standard deviation divided by the mean (Sachs, 1982: 77).  The CV is 
useful for comparing variances between data sets.  In essence, CV normalizes the risk and 
uncertainty in estimates among various programs (GAO, 2009: 98).  The CV is useful for 
comparing variability among program types.  It may be known from historical estimates 
that aerospace programs typically have an uncertainty range represented by 30 percent 
variability in cost.  If an estimator produces a point estimate with a CV lower than 30 
percent, it flags decision makers that there may be overoptimistic assumptions in the 
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estimate, or at least some justification should be provided for the abnormally low CV.  
Categorizing appropriate CV ranges for different programs at particular points of the 
acquisition lifecycle is important because they are easy for decision makers to 
comprehend.   
Previous Research 
 The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency categorized CV ranges for Air Force 
programs in a study conducted in conjunction with Tecolote Research, Inc. for the 2007 
version of the Air Force Cost Risk Uncertainty Handbook.  The CV ranges were derived 
from a study of Selected Acquisition Report data on completed Air Force programs.  The 
details of the methodology are not disclosed, but AFCAA acknowledges that the results 
are consistent with observed rules-of-thumb.  AFCAA concedes further study is needed 
to produce higher fidelity in their recommendations (AFCAA, 2007: 26). 
 In 2011 the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) produced a study which 
analyzed coefficient of variation to determine five conjectures: 1) CVs in current cost 
estimates are consistent with those computed from acquisition histories 2) CVs decrease 
throughout the acquisition life cycle 3) CVs are equivalent for aircraft, ships, and other 
platform types 4) CVs decrease when adjusted for changes in quantity and inflation 5) 
CVs are steady over the long run.  The study analyzed 100 naval acquisition programs 
from Selective Acquisition Reports.  The researchers used the baseline estimate and the 
current estimate to calculate a cost growth factor for each program.  The current estimate 
divided by the baseline estimate is equivalent to the cost growth factor.  A distribution 
was fit around the data points and the coefficient of variation was calculated.  The 
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researchers grouped the data points into categories for time and program type.  They 
wanted to determine if the CVs decrease over time or are similar among program type.  
The analysis yielded: 1) CVs are historically pervasively underestimated 2) CVs decrease 
throughout the acquisition lifecycle 3) CVs are equivalent among program type 4) CVs 
decrease for changes in quantity and inflation 5) CVs are not steady over time (Garvey 
and Flynn, 2011: 20-29). 
 The previous research differs because AFCAA determined the CV ranges among 
program types differ, whereas NCCA found that CVs are equivalent regardless of 
program type.  AFCAA also recommend one range per program type regardless of where 
the program was in its acquisition lifecycle.  NCCA found that CVs decrease overtime 
and the CV should be adjusted to accurately capture uncertainty. 
 AFCAA and NCCA studies utilized SAR data to conduct the analysis, as have 
most cost growth studies.  The problem is that SAR data are usually inaccurate.  The 
estimate in SARs does not always equal the Program Office Estimate (POE), the 
Independent Cost Estimate (ICE), or Non-Advocate Cost Assessment (NACA).  These 
estimates are typically the final estimate derived from sources most familiar with the 
program.  The current estimate in a SAR aligns with the President’s Budget submission.  
The budget submission is the amount programmed for the MDAP but it does not always 
reflect the forecast of the cost estimators. 
 A study found that SAR data fail to use consistent baseline costs, exclude 
significant elements of cost, exclude classes of major programs, change preparation 
guidelines, inconsistently interpret preparation guidelines, produce unknown and variable 
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funding levels for program risk, share costs in joint programs, and report the effects of 
cost changes rather than their root causes (Hough, 1992: 5).  These inaccuracies reflect 
poorly on the quality of the SAR database.  The imprecise data found in SARs does not 
invalidate previous cost growth studies; it merely reinforces the need for caution when 
examining the results of the studies (Hough, 1992: 42).  The best source of data for 
individual weapon system remains with the program offices (Hough, 1992: 42) 
Conclusion 
 This chapter provides an overview of related topics and previous research.  The 
literature review begins with an overview about the importance of cost estimating in DoD 
acquisitions.  The importance of capturing risk when briefing decision makers about 
estimates is then discussed.  Finally, we reviewed the previous literature concerning 
descriptive statistics, specifically coefficient of variation.  The goal of this chapter is to 
provide the reader with the scope of this study.  The next chapter, the methodology, 
presents the step-by-step directions to reenact the analysis of the researcher.  The 
limitations and assumptions of this study are discussed in detail.  Subsequently, the 
model used to determine the optimum range for coefficient of variation throughout the 
acquisition lifecycle is presented.  
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III. Methodology 
This chapter describes the data used for determining the optimal range for the 
coefficient of variation in cost estimates at different stages in a program’s acquisition 
lifecycle. The limitations and assumptions are described in detail.  Last, the theoretical 
and practical application of the processes and procedures for conducting the analysis are 
detailed, which provides the reader the ability to replicate the analysis. 
Data Source 
 The primary data for this analysis come from four acquisition product centers 
around the United States Air Force, and the secondary data come from the Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database.   Aerospace Systems 
Center, Air Armament Center, Space and Missile Center, and Electronics Systems Center 
provided the primary data for the analysis.  The secondary data come from DAMIR 
which is a DoD initiative that provides enterprise visibility to acquisition program 
information.  DAMIR is managed and operated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics/Acquisition Resource Analysis. 
Primary Data 
The primary data are PowerPoint® briefing slides that are developed for the 
program office estimate (POE) or the independent cost estimate (ICE).  The slides are 
used to brief either the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) or the Air Force Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) during the annual program reviews.  The slides 
include the current status of the program, the current point estimate and risk range, and 
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Category Description
Year The year the presentation was developed
Platform Type The type of weapon system. Ex. Avionics, Engine, Plane, Satellite
CV The coefficient of variation of the risk analysis
Mean The mean estimate oof the risk analysis
Standard Deviation The standard deviation of the risk analysis
Lifecycle Location The specific location of the program. Ex. Milestone B+3 is the program 3 years past MS B
Milestone Location The current location of the program. Ex. Milestone B or C
80 % Confidence The 80% confidence level of the Monte Carlo simulation used in the risk analysis
Program Office Estimate The point estimate provided by the program office or AFCAA
Base Year The year the base line estimate was established.  Usually the date of Milestone B
Estimate Dollars Base Year or Future year for the program office estimate
Lifecycle Stage System Development & Demonstration or Production & Deployment
Program Type MDAP or MAIS
future outlook of the program. An example of the slides is attached in Appendix A.  The 
slides are unique to this analysis because they contain the risk and uncertainty ranges of 
the cost estimate each year. The annual replication of the slides provides an update to the 
changes in the uncertainty of the program and insight to the overall progress.  Also, the 
briefings are derived by the program office cost estimator and program manager who 
possess first-hand knowledge of the program. 
The Powerpoint® slides were reviewed for specific information and not all 
presentations contained the same categories of information.  The categories of 
information along with a description of the categories are shown in Table 3.1.  The most 
critical piece of information needed for this analysis was the CV calculated by the 
program office.  Appendix A shows some examples of the specific information utilized 
for the analysis. 
Table 3.1 Powerpoint® Slide Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Typical cost growth studies use Selective Acquisition Reports (SAR) as the 
primary data source. The SARs do not contain risk and uncertainty ranges.  The SARs 
Table 3.1  er i t  li e I f r ti  
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typically present a point estimate that has been adjusted by several agencies more distant 
to the program.  The SARs are usually updated after the POE and ICEs are reviewed by 
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).  The SARs serve as the source for the 
secondary data for this study. 
Secondary Data 
The secondary data are retrieved from DAMIR.  DAMIR is an online database 
that contains DoD acquisition program information.  Specifically, the SARs for all Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information Systems are contained 
in DAMIR. The previous cost growth studies, mentioned in chapter two, used SAR data 
to perform their analysis.  The research of Garvey and Flynn, on the coefficient of 
variation in naval programs, used SAR data to compute Cost Growth Factors to analyze 
appropriate CV ranges for naval programs (Flynn and Garvey, 2011:21).  Because this 
research is attempting to replicate Flynn and Garvey’s study with Air Force programs, 
this research will use the SAR data from the programs contained in the primary data.  The 
program offices provide 30 program’s slides.  The secondary data are the SARs for the 
same 30 programs.  This method provides secondary study to the analysis and compares 
the results of this study to that of Flynn and Garvey’s.   
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A list of the 30 programs is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Data Provided From Program Offices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The SAR data used in this analysis were retrieved from the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database.  DAMIR was established to 
provide top level oversight to congress to report cost updates on all Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) for 
all of DoD.  SARS are supposed to be published every year after a program enters 
Table 3.2  Data Provided From Program Offices 
Program Product Center Platform Type Program Number
JASSM-ER AAC Missile 1
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC Avionics 2
C-5 RERP ASC Engine 3
C-27J ASC Plane 4
C-130 AMP ASC Avionics 5
C-130J ASC Plane 6
CRH (H-47) ASC Helicopter 7
CRH (H-71) ASC Helicopter 8
CVLSP ASC Helicopter 9
Global Hawk ASC UAV 10
HCMC 130J ASC Plane 11
LAIRCM NexGen MWS ASC Electronic 12
MQ-9 Reaper ASC UAV 13
B-2 DMS ASC Avionics 14
B-2 EHF Inc 2 ASC Avionics 15
B-2 EHF Inc 3 ASC Avionics 16
MQ-1C Gray Eagle ASC UAV 17
3 Dim Lng Rng Radar ESC Electronic 18
AF-IPPS ESC Computer Sys 19
AFNet Inc 1 ESC Computer Sys 20
AOC Inc 10.2 ESC Computer Sys 21
ITS Inc 2 ESC Computer Sys 22
MPS Inc III ESC Computer Sys 23
MPS Inc IV ESC Computer Sys 24
GPS III SMC Satellite 25
SBIRS GEO 1-2 SMC Satellite 26
SBIRS SFP GEO 3 SMC Satellite 27
SBIRS SFP GEO 4 SMC Satellite 28
SBIRS SAR SMC Satellite 29
SBSS Block 10 SMC Satellite 30
 
33 
Milestone B until the program reaches 90 percent completion; however, there are always 
exceptions.  SARs are sometimes not published during election years due to political 
influences.  For example, very few programs published SARs in 2008.  Also, some 
programs elect not to publish SARs if they are about to enter Milestone C or rebaseline to 
eliminate redundancy, because programs are required to publish a SAR for every new 
milestone or rebaseline.   
This analysis focused on the Cost and Funding section of the Selective 
Acquisition Reports.  An example is shown in Appendix B.  The current estimate and the 
baseline estimate in base year dollars were extracted to calculate the Cost Growth Factor 
(CGF) as shown in Equation 3.1. 
        CGF = current estimate/baseline estimate                           (3.1) 
 
Other sections of the SAR were utilized to gain more knowledge about the status of the 
program including: Executive Summary, Responsible Office, Threshold Breaches, and 
Schedule, but the Cost and Funding section was the primary focus area.  The researcher 
was able to gain a greater sense of awareness about the program by combining the 
information from the SAR with the program office estimate slides. 
Data Limitations 
 The primary data are provided by four separate product centers.  All four offices 
analyze and present their results differently.  The methods used to capture uncertainty 
vary among program offices.  The external influence on the cost estimate changes 
between programs.  These external factors lead to the data not being standardized among 
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program offices.  Also, the primary data are peer-review briefings and AFCAIG 
briefings.  The peer review briefs are analyzed at the program office prior to the program 
office explaining and defending their estimate to AFCAA.   After the AFCAA review, the 
AFCAIG brief is developed and given to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) prior to an adjustment to the SAR.   
The two sources, peer-review and AFCAIG briefings, employed for the primary 
data introduce potential error to the analysis; however, the data are more realistic than 
SAR data because they are produced by sources closer to the program and contain 
confidence levels and risk analysis.  The reason both peer review and AFCAIG briefs are 
used is there is no standardized data repository similar to DAMIR for cost estimates.  
Instead, a search through the program office’s file archives provides as many briefings as 
possible to ensure normality in the analysis.   
This method of collecting the data is considered a sample of convenience and 
introduces sources of error.  The sample may not be the most accurate representation of 
the population.  Ideally, it is best to test the entire population or, if possible, take a 
random sample of the population.  The limited collection of data at the program offices 
and AFCAA combined with resource constraints on this analysis make the convenience 
sample the only feasible alternative.   The use of the SARs as secondary data mitigates 
some of the error added in the analysis and adds validity to the study. 
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The sampling technique limited the amount and type of data available.  The 
sample yielded 30 programs.  The sample breakdown of the programs by platform type is 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the current population of all MDAPs and MAISs by platform type in 
2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Number of Programs by Location in Sample 
Figure 3.2  Number of Programs by Platform Type in Population 
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 The sample was broken down further to capture programs by platform type.  This 
is done to analyze whether or not the recommended CV range should differ by platform 
type.  Figure 3.3 shows the programs broken down by platform type in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Programs by Platform Type in Sample 
Figure 3.4 shows the programs in the population broken down by platform type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Programs by Platform Type in Population 
 
Figure 3.3  Programs by Platform Type in Sample 
Figure 3.4  Programs by Platform Type in Population 
 
37 
There are two additional programs included in the sample that are not currently in 
the MDAP or MAIS population.  The C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) 
was cancelled in the FY13 budget, and the C-27J is expected to be cancelled in the same 
year and no longer shows up on the MDAP list.  Both programs fall under the ASC 
program location.  The C-130 AMP program falls into the avionics platform and the C-
27J is included in the plane platform type.  These programs were included in the sample 
because the program office provided historical program office estimates which included 
the coefficient of variation calculations.  
 The coefficient of variation calculations were not conducted regularly by program 
offices until 2007 when AFCAA published the recommended CV ranges for program 
offices (AFCAA, 2007:26).  Therefore, the data were filtered to include only programs 
that were current as of 2007.  This limits the size of the population and reduces the power 
of the analysis.  The sample included as many programs as possible across a range of 
platform types to reduce some of the error.    
Theoretical Procedures and Processes 
 The goal of this analysis is to answer the research questions developed in Chapter 
1.  Simplified, the intentions are to recommend CV ranges for Air Force acquisition 
programs, determine if different CV ranges should be used based on platform type, and 
determine if CV decreases over the course of the program’s acquisition lifecycle. 
Chebyshev’s Rule 
 The method used to determine the recommended ranges of CVs for programs is 
Chebyshev’s rule also known as Chebyshev’s inequality.  Chebyshev’s rule is used to 
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determine the range of CVs because it applies regardless of the distribution of the data.  
The rule guarantees that in any probability distribution, no more than 1/k
2
 of the 
distribution’s values can be more than k standard deviations from the mean.   
2
1
(| | )P X k
k
      with k > 0                                             (3.2) 
 
Therefore, the probability that the absolute difference between a variable and its mean is 
greater than three standard deviations is no more than 1/3
2
 or 0.11 (Sachs, 1984:64). 
1
(| | 3 ) 0.11
9
P X                                                     (3.3) 
By using Chebyshev’s inequality, the mean and standard deviation of any grouping of 
calculated coefficient of variations or cost growth factors can be used to calculate a range 
of CVs that will capture at least 89% of acquisition programs.  The range can then be 
recommended to cost analysts to use when producing cost estimates.  Analysts will have 
confidence that enough risk and uncertainty are included in estimates which is suitable 
for at least 89% of Air Force programs.  The ranges will be operationalized in order to 
recommend CV benchmarks depending on the type of weapon system or the phase of the 
acquisition lifecycle depending on the results of this analysis. 
Tukey’s HSD Test  
 The method for determining if different CV ranges should be used based on 
platform type is analyzing the CVs and CGFs through a Tukey’s Honestly Significant 
Difference (HSD) test.  The Tukey method is a multiple comparison statistical test.  Its 
purpose is to find means between groups that are statistically significant from each other 
(Sachs, 1984:534).   
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The null hypothesis of the Tukey test is that all the means are equal. 
0
1
i j
i j
H
H
 
 
 
 
                                                           (3.4) 
The test statistic for comparing each group to each other is computed by: 
/
i j
D
MSE n
 
                                                         (3.5) 
 
where 
i = mean of first group 
j = mean of second group 
MSE = Mean Squared Error 
N =number in each group 
 The test statistic for each group comparison is used in conjunction with the 
studentized range distribution to test the probability, 1-α, that all differences 
i j  will 
satisfy the hypothesized inequalities.  The degrees of freedom is equal to the total number 
of observations minus the number of means (Sachs, 1984:534) (Larsen and Marx, 
2001:647).  
In order for the Tukey HSD test to be valid, three test assumptions must be met.  
The observations being tested must be independent, normally distributed, and 
homoscedastic.  Independence means the tested variables, CV and CGF, are unrelated in 
a probabilistic sense.   In other words, the occurrence of a previous variable does not 
affect the probability of the next variable (Sachs, 1984:204).  The CV and CGF data will 
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be tested separately and a comparative analysis will be performed, post hoc, to validate 
trends in the data. 
 The normally distributed assumption is important because a Tukey analysis is 
essentially separate t-tests, discussed later, between the different tested groups.  The 
normally distributed assumption is met if the tested variables are derived from a normally 
distributed population (Sachs, 1984:58-60).  This analysis uses the Shapiro-Wilk 
goodness-of-fit test to confirm the normality assumption.  The null hypothesis of the 
Shapiro-Wilk test is that the sample comes from a normally distributed population.  
Therefore, to prove the normality assumption the test must fail to reject the null 
hypothesis by having a p-value greater than the alpha level of 0.05 (Everitt, 2002:343-
344).  The Shapiro-Wilk test statistic is shown in Equation 3.6. 
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                                                     (3.6) 
where 
iy =the sample data 
ia = the constants to be evaluated 
 The last assumption needed for the Tukey test to be valid is homoscedasticity or 
equality of variance.  The homoscedasticity assumption is valid if the variables within the 
group have the same variance.  This allows the means between the different groups to be 
compared for significance (Sachs, 1984:494).   
   In this analysis, the groups are divided into platform type which is defined by the 
physical location of the program office.  The program offices are located at four separate 
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product centers: Aerospace Systems Center, Air Armament Center, Electronics System 
Center, and Space and Missile Center.  The product centers represent the type of 
platform: Aerospace Systems Center represents aircraft programs, Air Armament Center 
represents missile and bomb programs, Electronics Systems Center represents electronic 
programs and the Space and Missile Center represents space programs.  The groups are 
defined by the physical location of the program office because the sample is not large 
enough to separate the programs by the type of weapon system: airplane, helicopter, 
UAV, electronic, missile, or satellite.  Ideally, analyzing the data by the type of weapon 
system regardless of program office location would be best; however, the sample size in 
this study limits the capability to analyze the data in this manner.  The purpose of 
separating the data into groups is to see if there are statistically significant differences 
between the means of the groups.  If there are differences in means, then it can be stated 
that there should be different CV ranges based on platform type.  The ranges are 
determined by the application of Chebyshev’s inequality mentioned previously. 
Paired t-test 
 The method used to determine if the coefficient of variation decreases over a 
program’s lifecycle is a paired t-test.  The difference from the last CV calculated and the 
first CV calculated are used as the observations.  The t-test is paired because the 
individual observations, the last and first observation, are as homogeneous as possible 
(Sachs, 1984:307).  The CVs are calculated from the same program. 
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The t-test is used as a one sided test.  The hypothesis is shown in Equation 3.7. 
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                                                               (3.7) 
The test statistic for the paired t-test is shown in Equation  3.8. 
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For this test, if the p-value is less than the alpha of 0.05 then the test will be rejected.  The 
rejection provides statistically significant evidence that the CV decreases over time.  The 
t-test assumes the differences calculated for each pair, the last and first calculated CVs, 
are normally distributed.  The normality assumption is validated using the Shapiro-Wilk 
test as mentioned earlier. 
Practical Procedures and Processes 
 JMP® software from SAS is used to conduct the analysis.  JMP® is statistical 
software which combines robust analytics with dynamic graphics to enable visual 
discovery (SAS, 2012).  The data are input into JMP® with each program entered as its 
own data point.  The program represents one data point regardless of how many years of 
cost estimates are gathered for that program.  For example, the C-5 Reliability 
Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) includes estimates for FY04, FY05, 
FY07, and FY10; however, the C-5 RERP is entered as one data point represented by a 
single row in JMP®.   
 The columns in the analysis represent individual characteristics for each program.  
Each column represents one year of program data.  The different columns represent the 
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categories and calculations including: Year, Platform Type, CV, Mean, Standard 
Deviation, Lifecycle Location, Milestone Location, 80% Confidence, Program Office 
Estimate, Base Year, Estimate Dollars, Lifecycle Stage, Program Type. The arrangement 
of data facilitates simple calculations to answer the research questions. 
The first research question is, “Does analyzing the coefficient of variation ranges 
from Selective Acquisition Reports and Program Office Estimates match the coefficient 
of variation ranges provided by AFCAA in the AFCRUH?”  To test this question a Tukey 
analysis is performed. A Tukey analysis tests the total number of means in a sample.  It is 
suitable for testing two or more groups of means to determine if there is a difference 
(Sachs 1982: 534). This calculation will utilize the column “CV” and “BY CGF”. If the 
Tukey analysis shows there is a difference in means depending on platform type or 
program location (as currently assumed in AFCRUH), then a distribution for these 
columns will be analyzed and Chebyshev’s rule will be applied to the distributions.  A 
range will be calculated using Chebyshev’s rule and compared to the current 
recommendations in AFCRUH.  
The Second research question is, “Should there be different coefficient of 
variation ranges for dissimilar platform types (aerospace, electronics, and Space and 
Missiles) for Air Force programs?”  The Tukey analysis will be used to compare the 
means based on platform type and program office location. JMP® makes the calculation 
effortless by plotting a Y by X graph and comparing means across all pairs.  JMP® will 
automatically calculate the Tukey analysis and graphically display the groups and the 
statistically significant differences in means.  It can then be determined if there are 
differences in means for groups of programs based on either program office location or 
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platform type.  If it is determined that there is a difference in means for certain groups, 
then different recommended ranges can be provided to cost estimators based on program 
type 
The final research question is, “Do coefficient of variations for Air Force 
programs change over time?” A paired t-test is performed to analyze the change in CV 
over time.  The paired t-test is used for comparing the effects in similar samples (Sachs 
1982: 308).  The samples in this analysis represent the program’s coefficient of variation 
at the earliest documented point in the program, and the program’s coefficient of 
variation at the latest documented point in the program.  For example, the  C-5 RERP 
contains a CV calculation in FY04 which will represent the earliest calculated CV.  The 
CV calculation for FY10 represents the latest documented calculation.  The difference 
will be the latest calculation less the earliest calculation and represent the column for 
“Program Office Estimate Coefficient of Variation Change.”  The paired t-test will test 
the significance of the mean being less than zero (Sachs 1982: 308).   
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                                                                        (3.9)  
If the mean is less than zero, the test will reject and conclude that the CV does decrease 
over time for Air Force Programs.  It would then be plausible to conclude that different 
CV ranges be used based on the location of a program in its acquisition lifecycle.  
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Conclusion 
 This chapter describes the data used in the analysis and highlights the limitations 
of the chosen data. There are two forms of data in this study: primary and secondary.  
The primary data are unique to this study and consist of briefings from program offices.  
The secondary data are more traditional to other cost growth studies because the data are 
retrieved from Selective Acquisition Reports. The processes and procedures are described 
in detail to enable the reader to replicate the analysis.  The study employs a Tukey 
analysis to test for differences in means for particular groupings of programs.  If it is 
determined there is a difference in means of the groups, then appropriate ranges for CV 
calculations are recommended for each of the groups using Chebshev’s rule.  Lastly, 
paired t-tests are used to analyze the differences of means between coefficients of 
variations to facilitate whether or not CVs decrease over a program’s lifecycle. 
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IV. Results 
 This chapter presents the results of the three research questions proposed in 
chapter one: 1) Does analyzing the coefficient of variation ranges from Selective 
Acquisition Reports and Program Office Estimates match the coefficient of variation 
ranges provided by AFCAA in the Air Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty Handbook; 2) 
Should there be different coefficient of variation ranges for dissimilar platform types 
(aerospace, electronics, and Space and Missiles) for Air Force programs; 3) Do 
coefficient of variations for Air Force programs change over time?  The techniques 
described in chapter three are utilized to produce the results of the analysis.  The 
relevance of the results is described followed by the accuracy and limitations of the 
results.   
CV Range Benchmarks  
 The Coefficient of Variation (CV) ranges provided by AFCAA in the AFCRUH 
are 35-45% for space systems, 25-35% for aerospace systems, and 10-20% for electronic 
systems (AFCAA, 2007: 8).  AFCAA used Selective Acquisition Reports (SARs) to 
conduct their study.  Contrary to the AFCAA study, the results of this analysis are 
derived through two methodologies to achieve the most accurate results possible.  The 
two methodologies utilize independent data sources: Program Office Estimates (POEs) 
and SARs.  The 30 programs analyzed in this study found contrary results to the AFCAA 
study regardless of the source of data utilized.   
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Program Office Estimates 
 The primary data for this study are POEs.  The POEs are produced by sources 
most familiar with the details of a particular program.  The data are separated by 
milestone location defined by the defense acquisition process.  The data used to 
determine a recommended CV range for programs at Milestone A of the acquisition 
lifecycle are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Program Office CV Data at Milestone A 
 
 
 
 
 
There are eleven data points from six different programs analyzed for Milestone 
A CV calculations.  The sample is small which limits the integrity of the conclusions, but 
the analysis is important to cost estimating.  Typical cost growth studies have used SARs 
as the primary data source.  SARs are not required for programs until the program 
reaches Milestone B.  Therefore, previous studies have not been able to provide accurate 
research on cost growth prior to Milestone B.  By utilizing POEs, this research 
overcomes that limitation. 
Program
Program 
Office Year
Platform 
Type
Milestone 
Location
Lifecycle 
Stage
Development 
Office
Program 
Type CV @ MS A
CRH (H-47) ASC 2012 Helicopter A SDD NACA MDAP 0.16
CRH (H-47) ASC 2012 Helicopter A PD NACA MDAP 0.16
CRH (H-71) ASC 2012 Helicopter A SDD NACA MDAP 0.27
CRH (H-71) ASC 2012 Helicopter A PD NACA MDAP 0.22
B-2 DMS ASC 2010 Avionics A SDD Program Office MDAP 0.19
B-2 DMS ASC 2010 Avionics A PD Program Office MDAP 0.08
B-2 EHF Inc 2 ASC 2010 Avionics A SDD Program Office MDAP 0.17
B-2 EHF Inc 2 ASC 2010 Avionics A PD Program Office MDAP 0.37
B-2 EHF Inc 3 ASC 2009 Avionics A SDD Program Office MDAP 0.18
AOC Inc 10.2 ESC 2009 Computer Sys A SDD AFCAIG MAIS 0.35
AOC Inc 10.2 ESC 2009 Computer Sys A PD AFCAIG MAIS 0.15
Table 4.1  Program Office CV Data at Milestone A 
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 The empirics of analyzing risk and uncertainty in defense acquisitions leads 
people to believe programs are very risky early on in the acquisition lifecycle.  In fact, a 
program has not begun engineering, manufacturing, or development if it is still in 
Milestone A.  A program is still conceptual in nature and the required technology to 
complete the program is still developing.  Conventional wisdom is that more risk and 
uncertainty is added to cost estimates prior to Milestone B since nothing is built yet.  This 
study analyzes the CVs calculated by program offices prior to Milestone B to further the 
research for this conjecture. The distribution for POE Milestone A coefficient of variation 
calculations and the results of the Shapiro-Wilk Normality test are shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1  CV Distribution for POE at Milestone A 
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The results show the data are Normally distributed.  This is verified by the Shapiro-Wilk 
test results which has a p-value greater than 0.05, therefore, the null hypothesis fails to 
reject.  Therefore, approximately 99% of the data fall within three standard deviations of 
the mean.  The quantiles of the distribution are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 CV Quantiles for POE at Milestone A 
 
 
 
 
 
The range which encompasses 99% of the data is 0.08 to 0.37.  To eliminate 
outliers and remain consistent with the analysis of all data analyzed in this study, the 
bottom 25% of the data and top 25% of the data are eliminated to narrow the range to a 
reasonably accurate recommendation.  The middle 50% of the data provide a range of 
0.16 to 0.27.  This is done because AFCAA currently recommends ranges in 10% 
intervals and ranges too large provide little insight for decision makers.   
The results of the Milestone A analysis show lower than anticipated CV 
calculations for programs early in the acquisition lifecycle.  Regardless of weapon system 
type, the ranges are below the AFCAA recommendations for program office estimates.  
Empirically, it is expected, and investigated later in this analysis, that CVs decrease as a 
100.0% 0.370
99.5% 0.370
97.5% 0.370
90.0% 0.366
75.0% 0.270
50.0% 0.179
25.0% 0.160
10.0% 0.096
2.5% 0.082
0.5% 0.082
0.0% 0.082
Quantiles
Table 4.2  CV Quantiles for POE at ilestone A 
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program matures.  If that hypothesis holds true and CVs are already below AFCAA 
recommended ranges, then we expect program office CVs throughout the acquisition 
lifecycle to be lower than forecasted.  
 A program enters Milestone B after receiving approval from the Milestone 
Decision Authority.  A program must have mature technology, approved requirements, 
full funding, approved acquisition strategy, approved acquisition baseline estimate, and 
an approved contract type (Schwartz, 2013:13).  Milestone B is the beginning of 
developing a physical system.  The risk and uncertainty should be closer to the top end of 
AFCAA recommended ranges because there is little to no actual data to derive a cost 
estimate.  The data used to find a recommended CV range for programs in Milestone B of 
the acquisition lifecycle are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Program Office CV Data at Milestone B 
 
 
 
 
 
In this analysis ten programs provide fourteen data points.  A distribution is fit to the data and 
analyzed to provide recommendations for CV ranges for programs at Milestone B.   
 
Program
Program 
Office Year
Platform 
Type
Milestone 
Location
Development 
Office Program Type
Lifecycle 
Stage
CV @ MS 
B
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2010 Avionics B Program Office MDAP SDD 0.17
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2010 Avionics B Program Office MDAP PD 0.27
C-5 RERP ASC 2007 Engine B Program Office MDAP SDD 0.02
C-5 RERP ASC 2007 Engine B Program Office MDAP PD 0.11
CVLSP ASC 2011 Helicopter B Program Office MDAP SDD 0.11
CVLSP ASC 2011 Helicopter B Program Office MDAP PD 0.08
LAIRCM NexGen MWS ASC 2012 Electronic B Program Office MDAP PD 0.03
MQ-1C Gray Eagle ASC 2009 UAV B Program Office MDAP SDD 0.15
3 Dim Lng Rng Radar ESC 2012 Electronic B Program Office MDAP SDD 0.31
3 Dim Lng Rng Radar ESC 2012 Electronic B Program Office MDAP PD 0.27
AFNet Inc 1 ESC 2011 Computer Sys B AFCAIG MAIS PD 0.02
ITS Inc 2 ESC 2011 Computer Sys B AFCAIG MAIS PD 0.04
GPS III SMC 2010 Satellite B Program Office MDAP SDD&PD 0.18
SBSS Block 10 SMC 2010 Satellite B Program Office MDAP SDD 0.15
Table 4.3  Program Office CV Data at Milestone B 
 
51 
The distribution of the analysis is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distribution is Normally distributed with a p-value of 0.2337 which fails to reject the 
null hypothesis.  The quantiles of the distribution are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the data pass the Shapiro-WIlk test, approximately 99% of the data lie within three 
standard deviations.  The range encompassing 99% of the data is 0.02 to 0.31.  However, 
the range is large and provides little value to decision makers.  The middle 50% of the 
100.0% 0.310
99.5% 0.310
97.5% 0.310
90.0% 0.290
75.0% 0.203
50.0% 0.129
25.0% 0.036
10.0% 0.021
2.5% 0.019
0.5% 0.019
0.0% 0.019
Quantiles
Figure 4.2  CV Ranges Data Analysis for POE at Milestone B 
Table 4.4  CV Quantiles for POE at Milestone B 
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data show a range of 0.04 – 0.20.  This range provides insight and is easier to 
comprehend for decision makers.  The data show that for cost estimates to include a 
typical amount of risk and uncertainty for programs at Milestone B the CV calculation 
should be between 0.04 – 0.20.  This range is lower than the AFCAA recommendations 
for CV of 0.10-0.45 which varies depending on weapon system type.   
 A program must receive permission from the Milestone Decision Authority to 
enter into Milestone C, Production and Deployment.  The programs must have passed 
developmental testing and operational assessments, demonstrate interoperability, prove 
affordability, and be fully funded.  Entering Milestone C is the beginning of low-rate 
initial production.  If the program passes operational test and evaluation then it can enter 
into full-rate production (Schwartz, 2013: 10).   
 Milestone C coefficient of variation calculations are hypothesized to be lower 
than Milestone A and B because more actual data has been recorded and there are less 
unknowns and changes in the program.  However, changes do occur to programs late in 
the acquisition lifecycle and the empirics show changes later in the lifecycle cost more 
than changes earlier in the acquisition lifecycle.   
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The data used to find a recommended CV range for program in Milestone C of the 
acquisition lifecycle are shown in Table 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The sample of POEs from Milestone C includes fourteen data points from ten programs.  
A distribution is fit to the data points and analyzed to provide a range for CV at 
Milestone C.  The result of the fitted distribution for POE calculated CVS at Milestone C 
is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Program Office Year Platform Type Milestone Location Development Office Program Type
Lifecycle 
Stage
CV @ MS 
C
JASSM-ER AAC 2011 Missile C AFCAIG MDAP PD 0.20
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2011 Avionics C Program Office MDAP SDD 0.08
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2012 Avionics C AFCAIG MDAP PD 0.09
C-5 RERP ASC 2010 Engine C AFCAIG MDAP SDD 0.11
C-5 RERP ASC 2010 Engine C AFCAIG MDAP PD 0.02
C-27J ASC 2011 Plane C Program Office MDAP PD 0.14
C-130J ASC 2011 Plane C Program Office MDAP PD 0.05
HCMC 130J ASC 2011 Plane C Program Office MDAP SDD 0.18
HCMC 130J ASC 2011 Plane C Program Office MDAP PD 0.04
MQ-9 Reaper ASC 2011 UAV C AFCAIG MDAP SDD 0.14
MQ-9 Reaper ASC 2012 UAV C AFCAIG MDAP PD 0.13
MQ-1C Gray Eagle ASC 2011 UAV C Program Office MDAP SDD 0.25
MPS Inc III ESC 2009 Computer Sys C AFCAIG MAIS PD 0.21
MPS Inc IV ESC 2010 Computer Sys C AFCAIG MAIS LCC 0.27
Figure 4.3 CV Ranges Data Analysis for POE at Milestone C 
Table 4.5  Program Office CV Data at Milestone C 
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The results of the data analysis pass the Shapiro-Wilk test and represent a population that 
is Normally distributed.  Therefore, 99% of the data lie within three standard deviations 
of the mean.  The 99% range is 0.02 – 0.27.  The middle 50% of the data fall between 
0.07 – 0.20.  The quantiles of the analysis are shown in Table 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Milestone C marks the beginning of production where actual data is collected 
which aides cost estimators with forecasting future expenses.  Cost estimators are able to 
collect actual data and have a greater understanding of the program requirements.  
Therefore, Milestone C coefficient of variations might be lower than Milestone A and B 
and possibly the recommended ranges by AFCAA.   
 
 
 
C.I. CV
100.0% 0.270
99.5% 0.270
97.5% 0.270
90.0% 0.260
75.0% 0.199
50.0% 0.136
25.0% 0.069
10.0% 0.028
2.5% 0.020
0.5% 0.020
0.0% 0.020
Quantiles
Table 4.6  CV Quantiles for POE at Milestone C 
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The analysis of Program Office Estimates CV calculations are summarized in Table 4.7.  
The current AFCAA recommendations are shown for comparison reasons in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.7 AFIT Study POE CV Ranges by Milestone Location 
 
   
Table 4.8 AFCAA Recommend CV Ranges by Weapon System Type 
 
 
The results aid decision makers with assessing the validity of the cost estimates.  
If a cost estimate falls outside of the calculated Program Office CV ranges than a 
decision maker should take a deeper look into the procedures and methods used to derive 
the cost estimate.  If the CV falls outside of the CV ranges calculated from the 99% 
confidence intervals then a decision maker should seriously question the validity of the 
POE. 
 The results depict a more serious concern that POEs do not include enough risk 
and uncertainty.  The CV ranges calculated from the program office data are lower than 
the ranges recommended by AFCAA in the Air Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty 
Handbook.  With numerous studies reviewed in Chapter 2 where cost growth historically 
averages between 46-60%, conventional wisdom indicates more risk and uncertainty 
would be added in cost estimates than the AFCAA recommended values, not less.  
A B C
16-27% 4-20% 7-20%
AFIT Study
Electronics Aerospace Space
10-20% 25-35% 35-45%
AFCAA
 AFIT Study POE CV Ranges by ilestone Location 
Table 4.8  AFC A Recommend CV Ranges by Weapon System Type 
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Selective Acquisition Reports 
 The next step in this analysis is analyzing Selective Acquisition Reports to gain a 
broader understanding of CV ranges for cost estimates.  The SAR estimates for this study 
are separated into Milestone B and C.  There are no Milestone A calculations because 
SARs are not required for programs prior Milestone B.  The SARs are used to calculate 
the Cost Growth Factor (CGF).  A distribution is fit to the CGF data and analyzed.  The 
recommendations for the SAR data utilize Chebyshev’s Theorem and the middle fifty-
percent of the sample described in Chapter three, because the data does not pass the 
Shapiro-Wilk test and is therefore not from a Normal distribution.  Chebyshev’s Theorem 
allows the analyst to recommend CV ranges regardless of the shape of the CGF 
distribution.  Chebyshev’s Theorem states 89% of the data fall within three standard 
deviations of the mean of any distribution; however, this wide range does not provide 
much insight for decision makers.  Using the middle fifty-percent of the data narrows the 
range and provides decision makers with a reasonable range to evaluate risk and 
uncertainty in cost estimates 
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The data used to find a recommended CV range using SAR data for programs in 
Milestone B of the acquisition life are shown in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 SAR CGF Data at Milestone B 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A distribution is fit to the data to capture recommended CV ranges representative of the 
sample. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Program Office Year Platform Type Milestone Location Program Type PHASE CGF @ MS B
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2010 Avionics B MDAP SDD 1.03
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2010 Avionics B MDAP PD 0.85
C-5 RERP ASC 2007 Engine B MDAP SDD 1.00
C-5 RERP ASC 2007 Engine B MDAP PD 0.96
C-130 AMP ASC 2001 Avionics B MDAP PD 1.05
Global Hawk ASC 2009 UAV B MDAP SDD 2.23
Global Hawk ASC 2009 UAV B MDAP PD 4.03
MQ-9 Reaper ASC 2009 UAV B MDAP SDD 1.00
MQ-9 Reaper ASC 2009 UAV B MDAP PD 1.00
MQ-1C Gray Eagle ASC 2009 UAV B MDAP SDD 1.30
AFNet Inc 1 ESC 2011 Computer Sys B MAIS PD 0.96
ITS Inc 2 ESC 2011 Computer Sys B MAIS PD 0.66
GPS III SMC 2010 Satellite B MDAP SDD&PD 1.33
SBIRS SAR SMC 2011 Satellite B MDAP SDD 2.83
SBIRS SAR SMC 2011 Satellite B MDAP PD 10.32
SBSS Block 10 SMC 2010 Satellite B MDAP SDD 1.11
Figure 4.4  CGF Data from SARs at Milestone B 
Table 4.9  SAR CGF Data at Milestone B 
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The initial analysis utilizes sixteen data points from eleven programs.  The data are not 
from the Normal distribution and are skewed right.  The sample is heavily influenced by 
extreme cost growth outliers.  The quantity and requirements of the SBIRs program has 
led to extreme cost growth of the program.  Also, the Global Hawk UAV has proven 
extremely useful in wartime theatre.  The users have demanded more Global Hawks with 
better technology.  The result has been cost growth greater than 300% of the initial 
baseline.   
 The results show that 89% of the data lie between 0.23 –3.62.  The middle fifty 
percent fall between 1.20 – 2.48.    Although some cost growth is expected because of 
quantity and requirements changes, as discussed in chapter 2, the production cost growth 
associated with SBIRs and Global Hawk are extreme and atypical.  The quantiles of the 
analysis are shown in Table 4.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
The outliers’ effects on the sample lead to an analysis which removes the data 
points that can be explained by extreme quantity and requirements increases.  The result 
C.I. CGF CV
100.0% 10.323 3.623
99.5% 10.323 3.623
97.5% 10.323 3.623
90.0% 5.916 3.021
75.0% 2.003 2.475
50.0% 1.039 2.305
25.0% 0.967 1.195
10.0% 0.792 0.405
2.5% 0.661 0.232
0.5% 0.661 0.232
0.0% 0.661 0.232
Quantiles
Table 4.10  CV Quantiles for SARs at Milestone B 
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of the distribution analysis after the production CGFs for SBIRs and Global Hawk are 
removed is shown in Figure 4.5. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis shows the sample is not Normally distributed because the p-value for the 
Shapiro-Wilk test is 0.0004.  The CV recommendations for Milestone B after the outliers 
are removed shows 89% of the data fall between 0.20 - 0.88.  Since the 89% range is 
extremely large, the recommendation is narrowed to the middle 50% of the data.  The 
results are CVs between 0.45 - 0.61.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5  CGF Data from SARs at Milestone B Outliers Removed 
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 The quantiles of the distribution are shown in Table 4.11. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
The CV recommendation aides decision makers with determining if enough risk and 
uncertainty is built into a cost estimate.  The Milestone B CGF analysis shows decision 
makers an estimate with a CV between 45-61% is consistent with programs in Milestone 
B.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.I. CGF CV
100.0% 2.825 0.882
99.5% 2.825 0.882
97.5% 2.825 0.882
90.0% 2.527 0.773
75.0% 1.309 0.610
50.0% 1.017 0.574
25.0% 0.957 0.445
10.0% 0.755 0.231
2.5% 0.661 0.206
0.5% 0.661 0.206
0.0% 0.661 0.206
Quantiles
Table 4.11  CV Quantiles for SARs at Milestone B Outliers Removed 
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The Milestone C CGF analysis is conducted using the same methods to determine 
the Milestone C ranges.  The data used to find a recommended CV range using SAR data 
for programs in Milestone C of the acquisition life are shown in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.11 SAR CGF Data at Milestone C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, a distribution is fit to the data to analyze appropriate CV ranges for MDAPs at 
Milestone C.  The result of the Milestone C CGF analysis is shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Program Office Year Platform Type
Milestone 
Location Program Type PHASE
CGF @ MS 
C
JASSM-ER AAC 2011 Missile C MDAP PD 1.43
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2011 Avionics C MDAP PD 1.10
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2012 Avionics C MDAP SDD 0.77
C-5 RERP ASC 2010 Engine C MDAP SDD 0.98
C-5 RERP ASC 2010 Engine C MDAP PD 1.00
C-27J ASC 2011 Plane C MDAP PD 0.56
C-130 AMP ASC 2011 Avionics C MDAP PD 0.11
C-130J ASC 2011 Plane C MDAP SDD 36.09
C-130J ASC 2011 Plane C MDAP PD 16.38
HCMC 130J ASC 2011 Plane C MDAP SDD 1.59
HCMC 130J ASC 2011 Plane C MDAP PD 1.04
MQ-9 Reaper ASC 2011 UAV C MDAP SDD 1.29
MQ-9 Reaper ASC 2011 UAV C MDAP PD 1.06
MQ-1C Gray Eagle ASC 2011 UAV C MDAP SDD 1.04
MPS Inc III ESC 2009 Computer Sys C MAIS PD 1.07
MPS Inc IV ESC 2010 Computer Sys C MAIS PD 0.74
Figure 4.6  CGF Data from SARs at Milestone C 
Table 4.12  SAR CGF Data at Milestone C 
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The CV recommendations for Milestone C shows 89% of the data fall between  
0.26 - 86.73.  The recommendation is narrowed to the middle 50% of the data which 
yields CV results between 6.71 – 11.34.  The recommend range is extremely large 
because outliers from the C-130J and C-130 AMP programs.  The C-130J has increased 
the quantity to be purchased by 1500% from the original contract.  The C-130 AMP was 
cancelled and has a CGF that is atypical for that reason.  The quantiles for the anlaysis 
are shown in Table 4.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To account for the outliers, the analysis is performed again with the data points removed 
from the sample.   
 
 
 
 
C.I. CGF CV
100.0% 36.090 86.727
99.5% 36.090 86.727
97.5% 36.090 86.727
90.0% 22.292 22.102
75.0% 1.393 11.338
50.0% 1.048 8.920
25.0% 0.825 6.714
10.0% 0.423 0.420
2.5% 0.108 0.259
0.5% 0.108 0.259
0.0% 0.108 0.259
Quantiles
Table 4.13  CV Quantiles for SARs at Milestone C 
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A distribution is fit to the data and the results are analyzed.  Figure 4.7 shows the results 
after the outliers for the C-130J and C-130 AMP programs are removed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Milestone C CGF analysis with outliers removed represents a Normal distribution 
and shows 99% of the data are between 0.17-0.50.  The middle 50% of the data narrow 
the range to 0.23 – 0.32.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.I. CGF CV
100.0% 1.593 0.496
99.5% 1.593 0.496
97.5% 1.593 0.496
90.0% 1.527 0.438
75.0% 1.195 0.316
50.0% 1.038 0.267
25.0% 0.876 0.232
10.0% 0.632 0.181
2.5% 0.558 0.174
0.5% 0.558 0.174
0.0% 0.558 0.174
Quantiles
Figure 4.7 CGF Data from SARs at Milestone C with Outliers Removed 
Table 4.14  CV Quantiles for SARs at Milestone C Outliers Removed 
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The results of the CGF coefficient of variation analysis at Milestone B and C 
calculated using Selective Acquisition Reports are shown in Table 4.15.  For comparative 
reasons, the results of the NCCA are shown in Table 4.16 (Flynn, 2011:30). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These results aid decision makers in gauging whether a cost estimate is built with enough 
risk and uncertainty.  The SAR data shows that a cost estimate with a CV within one of 
the ranges shown in Table 4.14 is built with a typical amount of risk and uncertainty 
based on historical programs. 
The combination of the Program Office calculated CVs and the SAR calculated 
CVs provides further insight into appropriate CV benchmarks.  The results of POE and 
SAR calculated CVs are shown in Table 4.17.  
 
 
 
 
Milestone A Milestone B Milestone C
N/A 45-61% 23-32%
Air Force SAR Data
Milestone A Milestone B Milestone C
41-74% 31-54% 21-34%
NCCA Study
Milestone A Milestone B Milestone C
POE 16-27% 4-20% 7-20%
SAR N/A 45-61% 23-32%
SAR All Data
Table 4.15  Air Force SAR Calculated CV Ranges by Milestone Location 
Table 4.16  NCCA Calculated CV Ranges by Milestone Location 
Table 4.17  POE and SAR Calculated CV Ranges by Milestone Location 
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The ranges should be used to determine if there is enough risk and uncertainty in cost 
estimates.  The results of the study are intriguing.  Ideally, the recommend CV ranges 
should be the same.  The facts are that the CV ranges from SAR and POE calculations are 
drastically different.  Several arguments could be made for either approach.  The POE 
CVs could be based on risk adjusted estimates that are much higher than the programmed 
amount shown in SARs.  Less risk and uncertainty would be built into estimates that have 
higher values; further research is needed to investigate this possibility.  The POE CVs 
could also be lower because of pressures to secure funding or over overoptimistic 
assumptions that do not formulate. To further complicate matters, the AFCAA ranges fall 
somewhere between the POE and SAR calculated CVs.   The objective of this study is 
not to state which range is superior compared to the other.  The goal is to further the 
research of the usefulness of the coefficient of variation in the cost estimating career field 
and provide rigor to recommended ranges.   
 CV by Platform Type 
 The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency recommends ranges based on the type of 
program.  The research by Brain Flynn and Paul Garvey for the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis shows for Navy programs that there is no statistical difference that suggests 
there should be a different CV due to the type of weapon system developed.   In order to 
further the research of this topic, this study analyzes whether or not there is a statistical 
difference between the type of weapon system and the amount of risk and uncertainty in 
Air Force programs.  This study analyzes the POE calculated and SAR calculated CVs 
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using the Tukey Test outlined in chapter 3 to investigate whether or not CV ranges 
should be different because of the type of weapon system. 
 Relating back to the original research questions, the objective of the study is to 
investigate if the CV should be different based on the type of weapon system.  The 
research aims to collect enough data to compare the CV by the type of weapon system: 
helicopter, plane, computer system, satellite, UAV, electronics, or missile.  However, due 
to the limited amount of data available for this research it is not possible to get a 
statistically significant result based on the stated criteria.  Nevertheless, there is enough 
data to analyze the platform type by separating the programs by the program office 
location: Aerospace Systems Center (ASC), Electronics System Center (ESC), and Space 
and Missile Center (SMC).  The product centers represent the different weapon system 
platform types: ASC represents aircraft, ESC represents electronics, SMC represents 
space systems.  
Platform Type: POE 
The program offices’ calculated CVs are compared to distinguish differences in 
CV ranges based on weapon type which is determined by the product center location.  
The mean of all the CVs for a product center are compared against the other product 
centers in the sample using the Tukey test which is a means comparison test.  The null 
hypothesis of the Tukey test is that all the means are equal. 
0
1
i j
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                                                                  (4.1) 
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The results of the POE calculated CVs for Milestone A are shown in Table 4.18. 
 
 
 
 
With the p-value of 0.7069, the null hypothesis fails to reject and the conclusion is that all 
the means are equal.  The results of the Tukey test show that at the alpha level of 0.05 
there are no statistically significant differences between CVs of programs developed at 
Electronics Systems Center and Aerospace Systems Center.  Eleven programs data points 
representing six programs are analyzed.  There is limited data for programs in Milestone 
A, but the finding is the beginning of a trend when evaluating CV differences among 
varying program types. 
The study also looked at differences among program types at Milestone B.  The 
results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.19. 
 
 
 
 
 
The results show that at an alpha level of 0.05 there are no statistically significant 
similarities between CVs based on program type.  The analysis looks at 14 data points 
among ten programs developed at the Aerospace Systems Center, Electronics System 
Platform Type Electronics Aircraft
Electronics 0.7069
Aircraft
POE MS A Means Comparison(P-Values)
Platform Type Electronics Aircraft Space
Electronics 0.7696 0.9967
Aircraft 0.8092
Space
POE MS B Means Comparison(P-Values)
Table 4.18  Tukey Analysis Results POE CVs at Milestone A 
Table 4.19  Tukey Analysis Results POE CVs at Milestone B 
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Center, and Space and Missile Systems Center.  The result is consistent with the results 
found at Milestone A. 
 The data are then analyzed at Milestone C.  The results of the Milestone C 
analysis are shown in Table 4.20. 
 
 
 
 
 
The trend remains constant as there is no statistically significant difference at an alpha 
level of 0.05 between CV ranges based on program type.  The Milestone C analysis 
includes thirteen data points from nine different programs from the Electronics Systems 
Center and Aerospace Systems Center.   
 The significant finding from this research is that there should not be different CV 
ranges based on product center or program type.  This finding is contrary to the AFCAA 
recommendation in the Air Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty Handbook.  The popular 
belief among cost estimators is that different types of weapon systems have different 
levels of risk and uncertainty.  Brian Flynn and Paul Garvey spearheaded the analysis for 
naval programs and found there is no significant difference among platform types for 
Navy programs.  The research conducted for this study supports Flynn and Garvey’s 
findings, but for Air Force programs, when using the POE calculated CVs.   
Table 4.20  Tukey Analysis Results POE CVs at Milestone C 
Platform Type Electronics Aircraft
Electronics 0.0669
Aircraft
POE MS C Means Comparison (P-Values)
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Platform Type: SARs 
 The SARs Cost Growth Factors are analyzed to provide more integrity to 
coefficient of variation studies for DoD programs.  The study compares CGFs based on 
product center location to determine if there are significant differences among CGFs.  If 
there are differences in CGFs, then it is plausible that there should be different CV ranges 
based on weapon system platform type.  The Cost Growth Factors for each program are 
analyzed using the Tukey test to compare means of the varying platform types.  The 
results of the CGF analysis for weapon systems at Milestone B are shown in Table 4.22. 
 
 
 
 
The results show there is no statistically significant evidence to state the CVs should be 
different based on program type at the alpha level of 0.05 using CGFs from SARs.  The 
data include sixteen points from eleven programs.  The SBIRS and Global Hawk outliers 
discussed earlier in the chapter are included in the analysis.  The results of the analysis 
with the SBIRS and Global Hawk removed are shown in Table 4.22. 
  
 
 
Table 4.21  Tukey Analysis Results SARs at Milestone B 
Table 4.22  Tukey Analysis Results SARs at Milestone B Outliers Removed 
Platform Type Electronics Aircraft Space
Electronics 0.9295 0.2857
Aircraft 0.1941
Space
SAR MS B Means Comparison(P-Values)
Platform Type Electronics Aircraft Space
Electronics 0.6940 0.1776
Aircraft 0.2611
Space
SAR MS B Means Comparison(P-Values)
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The SARs are also analyzed at Milestone C to determine if there is a difference 
between program types later in the acquisition lifecycle.  The results are summarized in 
Table 4.23. 
Table 4.22 Tukey Analysis Results SARs at Milestone C 
 
 
 
 
 The results of the analysis show that there are no differences between platform 
type based on the SAR CGF calculations.  The analysis shown in Table 4.22 includes the      
C-130J and C-130 AMP outlier programs that were removed earlier when answering the 
first research questions of this analysis.  As a reminder, the outliers are removed in the 
next step of the analysis because of drastic quantity increases for the C-130J and program 
cancellation for the C-130 AMP.  
 In order to remain consistent throughout the analysis, the SAR CGF comparisons 
are analyzed with the outliers removed.  The results are shown in Table 4.24. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.23  Tukey Analysis Results SARs at Milestone C 
Table 4.24  Tukey Analysis Results SARs at Milestone C Outliers Removed 
Platform Type Electronics Aircraft
Electronics 0.1941
Aircraft
SAR MS C Means Comparison(P-Values)
Platform Type Electronics Aircraft
Electronics 0.5496
Aircraft
SAR MS C Means Comparison(P-Values)
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The results again yield no statistical difference between program types based on SAR 
CGF calculations. 
The results of this analysis are consistent with the POE calculated CVs and the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) calculated CVs by Flynn and Garvey.  However, 
the results differ from the recommended ranges from AFCAA which specify ranges 
based on platform differentiated by product center.  The lack of insight to the AFCAA 
study and the repeated finding that there are no statistically significant relationships 
between program type and CV range leads to the conclusion that there should not be 
different CV ranges based on program type.   
The sample used for this analysis is not large enough to compare every program 
office at every milestone point.  The results are only useful for the comparisons between 
the program offices within the sample.  However, the results remain the same regardless 
of which CV calculation is used and regardless of milestone which provides strong 
evidence to support the claim that there is no value in recommending CV ranges based on 
platform type.  Further research with a larger data set would provide integrity to the 
results of the analysis. In addition, the study attempted to compare CV ranges based on 
weapon system type: helicopters, airplanes, missiles, UAVs, electronics, and avionics, 
but the sample is not large enough to draw statistical inferences by weapon system 
categories.  
CV Changes Over Time 
 The final research question in this analysis is determining whether CV ranges 
should change as a weapon system progresses through the acquisition lifecycle.  The Air 
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Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty Handbook  recommends one CV range throughout the 
acquisition lifecycle.  Contrarily, the NCCA study found that CVs decrease overtime.  
The objective of this study is to further the research of appropriate CV ranges for DoD 
programs by analyzing Air Force programs through Program Office Estimates and 
Selective Acquisition Reports.  
Changes Over Time: POEs 
 The study uses a paired t-test to determine if CVs decrease over the acquisition 
lifecycle.  The first calculated CV from programs are subtracted from the last calculated 
CV for the program.  The selection criteria for the data are that there must be two CV 
calculations for the same program within System Development and Demonstration or 
Production and Deployment lifecycle stages.  The paired t-test requires the differences to 
be Normally distributed for the test to be valid.  The data are shown in Table 4.25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program
Program 
Office Year Platform Type
Development 
Office
Program 
Type
Program 
Phase
Last CV - 
First CV
JASSM-ER AAC 2011 Missile AFCAIG MDAP PD -0.05
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2011 Avionics Program Office MDAP SDD -0.20
B-2 EHF Inc 1 ASC 2012 Avionics AFCAIG MDAP PD -0.08
C-5 RERP ASC 2010 Engine AFCAIG MDAP SDD 0.09
C-5 RERP ASC 2010 Engine AFCAIG MDAP PD -0.09
C-27J ASC 2011 Plane Program Office MDAP PD 0.13
HCMC 130J ASC 2011 Plane Program Office MDAP SDD -0.17
HCMC 130J ASC 2011 Plane Program Office MDAP PD -0.01
MQ-9 Reaper ASC 2012 UAV AFCAIG MDAP SDD 0.02
B-2 EHF Inc 2 ASC 2010 Avionics Program Office MDAP SDD -0.02
MQ-1C Gray Eagle ASC 2011 UAV Program Office MDAP SDD 0.10
3 Dim Lng Rng Radar ESC 2012 Electronic Program Office MDAP SDD -0.09
3 Dim Lng Rng Radar ESC 2012 Electronic Program Office MDAP PD -0.03
MPS Inc IV ESC 2010 Computer Sys AFCAIG MAIS LCC 0.03
GPS III SMC 2010 Satellite Program Office MDAP LCC -0.07
SBIRS GEO 1-2 SMC 2011 Satellite Program Office MDAP SDD 0.00
SBIRS SFP GEO 3 SMC 2010 Satellite Program Office MDAP SDD -0.01
SBIRS SFP GEO 4 SMC 2010 Satellite Program Office MDAP SDD 0.00
SBSS Block 10 SMC 2010 Satellite Program Office MDAP SDD -0.11
Table 4.25  POE Data for Changes on CV in Time 
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The analysis includes nineteen data points from fifteen programs.  The hypothesis of the 
analysis is that CVs will decrease over time because as a program matures there are more 
actual data which aid cost estimators with assessing risk and uncertainty.  The results of 
the analysis are depicted in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 4.81Paired T-Test Distribution of POE Calculated CVs 
Figure 4.98Paired T-Test P-Value 
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The null and alternative hypotheses of this t-test are shown in equation 4.2. 
0
0
o
a
H
H


                                                                  (4.2) 
The results show the paired t-test is not statistically significant at an alpha level of 
0.05.  However, the results are significant at an alpha level of 0.10.  The data pass the 
Shapiro-Wilk test validating the assumption of normality.  The results do not 
overwhelmingly state that CVs decrease over time based on this analysis, but it does not 
drastically state that CVs do not decrease overtime.  In statistical terms, the conclusions 
drawn from the test could violate a Type I or Type II error because the results are close to 
the critical value.  A Type I error is an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis.  For this 
analysis, Type I error represents stating the CVs decrease over time when they in fact do 
not decrease as a program matures.  A Type II error is failing to reject a false null 
hypothesis.  By stating that the CVs do not decrease as a program matures after analyzing 
this data, the drawn conclusions are in jeopardy of violating a Type II error because the 
null hypothesis fails to reject; however, if the null is in fact true that the CVs do decrease 
over time then the analysis has committed a Type II error.  
Changes Over Time: SARs 
To further the research on whether or not CVs decrease over time, the CGFs are 
compared between Milestone B and C calculated earlier.  A paired t-test is not 
appropriate for this analysis because there is only one CGF calculation per program.  The 
POE analysis utilizes two CV calculations per program. 
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 The results of the CGF range recommendations are again depicted in Table 4.26 below. 
 
 
 
 
A comparative analysis shows CVs do decrease over time based on the CVs calculated 
from the Cost Growth Factors.   
 To summarize, the conclusion as to whether or not CVs decrease over time is that 
there is statistical evidence which supports a decreasing CV range as a program matures 
through its lifecycle.  The conclusion is based on choosing a possible Type I error of 
stating the CVs decrease as a program matures when, in fact, they do not decrease.  The 
decision to draw the stated conclusion is based on the supporting Cost Growth Factor 
analysis which clearly shows a decrease in CV over time. The evidence is not as powerful 
as hypothesized, but the POE and SAR analysis of this study combined with the NCCA 
study supports the relationship of CVs decreasing over time. 
Limitations 
 The results of the study have limitations based on the quantity and quality of data.  
This is the first study analyzing coefficient of variation using source data from program 
office cost estimating briefings.   The availability of data is constrained to the number of 
records archived by program offices.  There is not an Air Force Instruction requiring 
program offices to maintain risk analysis data.  This limits the number of programs that 
are analyzed.  It would be beneficial for future research to require program offices or the 
Milestone A Milestone B Milestone C
N/A 45-61% 23-32%
Air Force SAR Data
Table 4.26  SAR Calculated CV Ranges by Milestone Location 
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SARs to maintain the CV of the estimates.  The smaller quantity of programs analyzed 
decreases the power of the statistical tests and decreases the certainty in the results.  
Ideally, the analysis would use annual AFCAIG briefs for every year of the program 
since the Analysis of Alternatives segment of the acquisition lifecycle.   
This study employs thirty Air Force ACAT I programs.  The programs are not 
evenly distributed amongst the four different product centers.  The programs are also not 
evenly distributed among the different acquisition lifecycle milestones.  Ideally, it is 
beneficial to have a similar number of programs from each product center representative 
of the population of ACAT I programs.  However, this research is sponsored by the 
former Aerospace Systems Center (ASC), today known as Life Cycle Management 
Center.  The data is provided primarily by ASC which skews the data towards programs 
related to aircraft.    
The cost growth studies reviewed in the literature review vary on the 
methodology for determining the Cost Growth Factor.  There are studies that normalize 
the CGF for quantity increases and decreases by dividing the estimate by the current 
quantity stated in the SAR.  The studies normalize for the quantity in order to analyze the 
data in terms of cost growth per unit.  A limitation of this analysis is that it does not 
analyze cost growth per unit.  This study analyzes cost growth on the program 
holistically.  The reason this study does not analyze cost growth per unit is because 
decision makers decide to enter Milestone B of the acquisition phase because they are 
under the assumption that they can procure a specific quantity at a specific cost.  It is the 
cost estimator’s responsibility to forecast, as accurately as possible, a realistic 
procurement quantity for the resources invested.   
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Summary 
 The objective of this chapter is to explain the results of the study using the 
methodology defined in chapter three to answer the research questions proposed in 
chapter one.   The goal of the first research question is to validate the CV ranges from the 
Air Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty Handbook through the analysis of POE and SAR 
calculated CVs.  The research found different CV ranges than those recommended in the 
Air Force Cost Risk and Uncertainty Handbook.  The research also found different CV 
ranges based on the type of data analyzed.  The conclusion furthers the research into 
appropriate CV ranges for Air Force Major Defense Acquisition Programs.   
 The objective of the second research questions is to analyze whether CV ranges 
should be different based on the type of weapon system analyzed.  The Air Force Cost 
Risk and Uncertainty Handbook recommends different ranges based on platform type.  
This research analyzed the platform type using POE and SAR calculated CVs.  The 
results show there are no statistically significant differences between Air Force platform 
types and coefficient of variation.  The results coincide with research performed by 
NCCA on Navy programs in 2012 which also found no difference in CV based on 
various weapon system platforms.  
 The last research question explores the notion that CVs should decrease as a 
program matures through the acquisition lifecycle.  The Air Force Cost Risk and 
Uncertainty Handbook does not provide different CV ranges based on the maturity of the 
program.  The NCCA study found CVs decrease over time.  This research used POE and 
SAR calculated CVs to further the research.  The results showed there is statistical 
evidence which supports CVs decreasing over time, but not to the tested significance 
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level.  However, the SAR calculated CVs clearly depict CVs decrease as a program 
matures.    
 The next chapter, the conclusions, summarizes the results of the three research 
questions proposed in chapter one.  It then discusses the implications of the findings for 
decision makers.  Lastly, it highlights topics for follow-on research in risk and 
uncertainty benchmarks for major defense acquisition programs.   
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V. Conclusions 
 The goal of this analysis is to answer the research questions developed in Chapter 
1.  Simplified, the intentions are to recommend coefficient of variation (CV) ranges for 
Air Force Acquisition programs, determine if different CV ranges should be used base on 
platform type, and determine if CV decreases over the course of the program’s 
acquisition lifecycle.  This chapter will briefly recap the results of each research 
questions and make a recommendation for each research question.  The implications of 
the study and the impacts of the recommendation will be discussed.  Lastly, potential 
follow-on research topics will be addressed to conclude this study. 
Recommended CV Ranges 
 The intent of the first research question is to provide Air Force cost estimators 
with coefficient of variation benchmarks for Air Force weapon systems.  The study uses 
data from Program Office Estimates (POEs) and Selective Acquisition Reports (SARs).  
This is the first study to analyze cost growth and CV benchmarks utilizing source data 
from program offices.  The results of this study are compared with previous research in 
the same arena.  The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) and the Naval Center for 
Cost Analysis (NCCA) performed studies which recommend CV benchmarks for their 
respective services. The results of both methodologies (POE and SAR) employed in this 
study are compared with the AFCAA and NCCA studies before making a 
recommendation. 
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The results of the studies are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
Table 5.1 CVs from AFIT and NCCA Studies 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 CVs from AFCAA Study 
  
 
 
After comparing the data of this study with the results of the AFCAA and NCCA 
studies, this study recommends Air Force programs use coefficient of variation 
benchmarks of: 41-74% during Milestone A, 45-61% during Milestone B, and 23-32% 
during Milestone C.  These recommendations are shown in Table 5.3.   
Table 5.3 AFIT Study CV Recommendations 
 
 
 
The recommendation for those benchmarks is made because three of the conclusions 
from the studies support each other.  The results of the AFCAA, NCCA, and SAR 
analysis of this study are fairly similar.  It is not coincidence that three studies make 
fairly analogous conclusions.  Also, sound reasoning derived from the results of the POE 
Electronics Aerospace Space
10-20% 25-35% 35-45%
AFCAA Results
Milestone A Milestone B Milestone C
41-74% 45-61% 23-32%
AFIT Study CV Benchmarks
Table 5.1  CVs from AFIT and NC A Studies 
Table 5.2  CVs from AFCA  Study 
Table 5.3  I  t y  eco e atio s 
Milestone A Milestone B Milestone C
AFIT- POE 16-27% 4-20% 7-20%
AFIT-SAR N/A 45-61% 23-32%
NCCA 41-74% 31-54% 21-34%
AFIT Summary
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analysis at Milestone B suggest that a program estimate with a low range of 4% 
variability at a stage in the acquisition lifecycle that has yet to manufacture the weapon 
system is irrational.  The extrapolation of learning curve probably has more than 4% 
variability, and the actual data to develop the learning curve has not been collected when 
a program is in Milestone B.  
 The recommendation of a 41-74% CV benchmark at Milestone A is derived from 
the NCCA study.  This recommendation was not substantiated by the results of the 
analysis in this study; however, the Milestone B and Milestone C recommendations are 
fairly similar.  It is more beneficial to have a recommended range at Milestone A that is 
based on Navy programs than to not have a recommendation at all.  It is assumed that if 
the recommendations at Milestone B and Milestone C are fairly analogous that Milestone 
A benchmarks will also be comparable; however, more research is needed to provide 
integrity to that part of the analysis. 
CVs by Platform Type 
 The intent of the second research question is to answer whether or not different 
CV ranges should be employed based on the type of weapon system developed.  The 
question is hypothesized because AFCAA recommends different CVs based on weapon 
system type; however, the NCCA study found CVs should be the same regardless of 
weapon system type.   
This study analyzed POE and SAR CVs and compared the results with the 
AFCAA and the NCCA results.  The results of both the POE and SAR analysis 
concluded that CVs should be the same regardless of platform type.  Since both analyses 
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validated the results of the NCCA study, the recommendation is that the same CV ranges 
should be applied to all weapon systems.   
Lifecycle CV Changes 
 The intent of the third research question is to determine whether or not CV ranges 
should be different based on the location of the program in the defense acquisition 
lifecycle.  The question is hypothesized because AFCAA recommends one CV range 
regardless of what stage the program is in during the acquisition lifecycle; however, the 
NCCA study found that CVs decrease over time because more information is learned as a 
program progresses through its lifecycle which reduces the risk and uncertainty in the 
cost estimate.  
 The results of this study found that at the tested alpha level of 0.05 the POE CVs 
do not decrease over time; however, at an alpha level of 0.10 the POE CVs do decrease 
over time.  The results were not conclusive enough to make a determination based on the 
results; however, when the SAR results are used in conjunction with the POE the results 
trend towards the claim that CVs decrease over time.  The combination of the POE, SAR, 
and NCCA results lead to the conclusion that CVs should decrease as a program matures 
through the acquisition lifecycle.  This conclusion is based on the acceptance of a Type I 
error based on the corroborating evidence.  This claim validates the recommended ranges 
which change based on the phase in the lifecycle of a program.   
 The last recommendation of this research is that there is extreme value in 
analyzing the results of the source data.  Decision makers should make it mandatory for 
program offices and independent agencies to maintain and track changes in CV, point 
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estimates, and risk-adjusted estimates.  This can be done by putting a coefficient of 
variation disclosure requirement on SARs or by making program offices and independent 
agencies responsible, and accountable through inspections, for archiving annual peer-
review and AFCAIG briefings.  During the data collection phase of this study, it was 
apparent there are no guidelines requiring program offices or independent agencies from 
archiving old source data.  The source data is extremely valuable for an in-depth analysis 
of the requirements, schedule, and cost changes throughout a program’s lifecycle. 
Implication of Findings 
 The implication of the findings is important because the results suggest that cost 
estimators should add more risk and uncertainty into cost estimates to increase the 
accuracy.  The result of added risk and uncertainty is higher risk-adjusted cost estimates.  
Higher risk-adjusted cost estimates could lead to the funding of less Air Force programs 
at a time when the nation is facing budget cuts while our nation is fighting a war in the 
Middle-East.  However, if decision makers are serious about reducing cost growth in the 
DoD acquisition system then they should enhance the review process to ensure 
appropriate amounts of risk and uncertainty are added to cost estimates.   
 The implementation of the recommended CV benchmarks will increase the 
accuracy of cost estimates.  The increased accuracy of estimates will increase the 
confidence of decision makers in the cost estimating community.  The CV 
recommendations will improve Air Force portfolio analysis because decision makers will 
have more accurate information regarding the resources needed to fund Air Force 
requirements.   
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Follow-On Research 
 This study employs source data for the first time when evaluating CV ranges for 
DoD systems.  The results of the source data compared with the SAR data are drastic.  
The findings leave the cost estimating community wondering why the results are so 
different.  Future research could help solve this problem.  This study does not analyze 
whether or not higher program office estimates are a reason for the lower CVs.  The 
estimate in the SARs is the number programmed for in the President’s Budget (PB); 
however, it is hypothesized that the number in the PB is not always the same as the 
number estimated by the cost community.  Comparing the source data estimates with the 
current estimates in the SAR could help answer this question.   
 The difference in POE and SAR data could also be attributed to optimistic 
assumptions or pressures to secure funding which lead to cost growth.  Could it be 
possible that there is a correlation between high POE CVs and less cost growth?  Future 
research could use the source data to determine if programs that implemented higher CVs 
in the POEs had less cost growth in the SARs.  Or if the risk-adjusted estimate in the 
POE is much higher than the SARs, are the lower CV ranges found in the POEs 
appropriate?   
 Lastly, the data employed in this analysis is provided primarily from the sponsor 
of the research, the Aerospace Systems Center now known as the Lifecycle Management 
Center.  The data is heavily influenced by ASC data.  Future research could continue the 
collection and use of POE data which would increase the power of the results and provide 
further integrity.   
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Appendix A:  Powerpoint® Slide Examples 
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Appendix B: SAR Cost and Funding Example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Cost and Funding 
Cost Summary 
Total Acquisit io n Cost and Quantity 
BY2000 SM 
BY2000 TY $M 
$M 
SAR Current APB Current SAR 
Current APB 
Current Appropriation Basel ine Development 
Estimate 
Basel ine Development 
Est imate DevEst Obj ective/Threshold DevEst Object ive 
RDT&E 1413.9 1280.4 1408.4 1416.4 ' 1538.5 1369.9 1577.6 
Procurement 7381.0 7574.7 8332.2 7061.6 9551.8 9630.7 9553.3 
Flyaway 6660.2 - - 5964.5 8623.4 - 8072.2 
Recurring 6626.2 - - 5964.5 8583.8 - 8072.2 
Non Recurring 34.0 - - 0.0 39.6 - 0.0 
Support 720.8 - - 1097.1 928.4 - 1481.1 
Other Support 517.3 - - 730.9 664.1 - 990.6 
Initial Spares 203.5 - - 366.2 264.3 - 490.5 
MIL CON 3.1 3.1 3.4 0.0 3.6 3.6 0.0 
AcqO&M 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 8798.0 8858.2 N/A 8478.0 11093.9 11004.2 11130.9 
' APB Bre~c-lt 
This SAR is submitted with cost and funding data based on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Presidenf s Budget 
(PB). As a result of the Nunn-McCurdy critical breach determination submitted in September 2007 and the 
OSD CAIG ICE confirmation of the critical breaches, neither the Procurement aircraft buy quantity profile in 
the FY09 PB nor the Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program is executable within the 
current approved FY09 PB funding (Nunn-McCurdy certification occurred after submission of the FY 2009 
PB). With certification complete, the 716 Aeronautical Systems Group (AESG) will submit a quarterly 
exception SAR following Milestone C decision for the restructured program. 
I Quantity I 
SAR Baseline 
I 
Current APB 
I Current Estimate I DevEst Development 
RDT&E 4 3 3 
Procurement 122 109 108 
Total 126 112 111 
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